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Abstract
In this chapter, we present theories and applications of reference-dependent pref-
erences. We provide some historical perspective, but also move quickly to the current
research frontier, focusing on developments in reference dependence over the last 20
years. We present a number of worked examples to highlight the broad applicability
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a short treatment of probability weighting and its links to reference dependence.
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1 Introduction
Reference dependence has been a core topic in behavioral economics. The theory of reference-
dependent preferences—born out of introspection and observation—captures a central intu-
ition that outcomes are not experienced on an absolute scale, but rather experienced relative
to some point of reference. Moreover, losses relative to the reference point are felt more
severely than commensurate gains. This notion of “loss aversion” not only rationalizes
prominent deviations from the canonical model of expected utility over final wealth, but also
has proven remarkably helpful for interpreting a broad swathe of economic behaviors.
This chapter has four principal aims. First, we discuss the intellectual history from deci-
sion making under uncertainty that led to the development of models of reference-dependent
preferences. Second, we attempt to move readers relatively quickly to the research frontier,
devoting substantial text to developments in reference dependence over the last 20 years.
Third, we provide a number of worked examples to highlight the potential for the broad
applicability of reference dependence—from risk taking, to labor supply, to consumer behav-
ior. Finally, we attempt to evaluate the literature, identifying potential gaps in our collective
understanding, and pointing towards valuable new research areas.
Before proceeding, some notes to the reader may be helpful for navigating the text. First,
as in the opening paragraph, we interpret “reference-dependent preferences” to mean models
with gain-loss utility derived from how realized outcomes compare to some reference point.
There exist other models that might also be called “reference-dependent” but which are not
articulated in terms of gains and losses—e.g., models of habit formation, inequity aversion,
state-dependent preferences, salience, and anticipated regret. This chapter does not cover
such models.
Second, reference dependence and loss aversion emerged from the literature on decision
making under uncertainty, and thus much of the literature is tied to choices over monetary
risk and associated risk preferences. However, reference-dependent preferences have proven
to be much more broadly applicable. Many applications come from outside the domain of
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monetary risk, and indeed often involve completely riskless choice.
Third, whereas Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed “prospect theory” to include
both reference-dependent preferences and nonlinear probability weighting, the subsequent
literature has often investigated these two phenomena separately. For the most part, this
chapter does so as well—studying the nature and implications of reference-dependent pref-
erences without reference to probability weighting.Recent research, though, has started to
identify ways in which reference-dependent preferences can generate predictions that are
similar to (and sometimes equivalent to) predictions from probability weighting. Hence,
before concluding, we provide a short treatment of probability weighting and discuss these
connections.1
Fourth, except for a short discussion in the concluding section, this chapter takes a posi-
tive approach to reference-dependent preferences. In other words, we focus on the behavioral
predictions of various reference-dependent preferences, and the extent to which those behav-
ioral predictions are consistent with observed behavior. In terms of language, then, we use
the term “preferences” to refer to models that predict what people do, and not what people
would like to do.
Finally, this chapter will hopefully provide benefits to both novice and more advanced
readers. Reading from the beginning will provide an overview of the basic models of ex-
pected utility and reference dependence in Sections 2 and 3. Readers already versed in these
models may want to skim this material and get more quickly to applications in Section 4.
Section 5 then provides a treatment of expectations-based reference dependence, and Section
6 describes applications that make use of expectations-based reference dependence. Section
7 provides an overview of reference-dependent “news” utility wherein a person experiences
gain-loss utility from a change in beliefs about future consumption. Section 8 provides the
above noted treatment of probability weighting, and Section 9 provides concluding thoughts.
1More complete treatments of probability weighting include Harless and Camerer (1994); Camerer (2000);
Fehr-Duda and Epper (2012); and Barberis (2013).
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2 Expected Utility
2.1 Overview and Some History
The foundations of modern theory of decision making under uncertainty begin in the eigh-
teenth century. The “St. Petersburg paradox,” discussed initially in correspondence by the
Bernoulli cousins, Daniel and Nicolas, and the mathematicians Pierre Montmort and Gabriel
Cramer (Bernouilli 1738, 1954), contradicted the idea that people ought to care only about
expected value. The paradox considers Peter and Paul. Peter proposes to toss a coin until
it lands on heads and give Paul 2n ducats if heads is first observed on the n-th toss. Though
such a prospect has infinite expected value, Paul is presumed unlikely to require an infinite
sum to sell this prospect (contradicting expected-value maximization).
Daniel Bernoulli’s proposed resolution (Bernouilli 1954) was that, rather than care about
the expected value of the monetary outcome, people instead care about the expected utility
associated with the monetary outcome. Moreover, Bernoulli identified the tight connection
between diminishing marginal utility for money and risk preference. Two centuries later the
expected-utility (EU) model took a central place in economics due to the work of Savage and
Samuelson (Savage 1953; Samuelson 1952, 1953). The resulting expected-utility theorem is
among the most elegant results in all of economics, providing a set of axioms for preferences
over prospects, the satisfaction of which ensures that a person’s behavior is consistent with
the EU model.
In this section, we review the EU model and some important issues that are relevant for
the literature on reference-dependent preferences. For more complete textbook treatments,
see Mas-Colell et al. (1995); Varian (1992); and Kreps (1990).
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2.2 The EU Model and Risk Aversion
We consider prospects of the form L ≡ (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xN , pN), where outcome xn occurs
with probability pn and
∑N
n=1 pn = 1. According to the EU model, when facing a choice set
L, a person should choose the L ∈ L that yields the largest expected utility—that is, the
L ∈ L that maximizes
U(L) ≡
N∑
n=1
pnu(xn) (1)
where u(·) is a utility function defined over outcomes, unique up to an affine transformation.
Work by Savage and Samuelson (Savage 1953; Samuelson 1952, 1953) identified a simple
set of axioms that imply the EU model. Specifically, as long as preferences over prospects are
complete, continuous, transitive, and satisfy the independence axiom, then those preferences
can be represented by the EU model. These axioms represent a set of testable properties of
the EU model. The axiom that has received the most attention is the independence axiom.
Independence Axiom: The preference relation % satisfies the independence axiom if for all
L,L′, L′′ and α ∈ (0, 1)
L % L′ ⇐⇒ αL+ (1− α)L′′ % αL′ + (1− α)L′′.
As in standard utility theory, completeness, continuity, and transitivity serve to deliver
a well-behaved function U(·). The independence axiom then implies that U(·) takes the EU
form, and in particular that U(·) is linear in probabilities.2
The EU model does not place any restriction on u(·). It turns out that the shape of u(·)
is tightly linked to one’s risk preferences. We use the following definitions of risk preferences:
2Expected utility became known as von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) preferences after the publication
of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Independence, however, was not among the discussed axioms,
but rather implicitly assumed. Samuelson (1952, 1953) discusses the resulting confusion and his suspicion of
an implicit assumption of independence in the vNM treatment. Samuelson’s suspicion was then confirmed
in a note by Malinvaud (1952). For an excellent discussion of the history of the independence axiom, see
Fishburn and Wakker (1995).
4
Definition: A person is globally risk-averse if, for any lottery L, she prefers a certain
payment equal to the expected value of L over the lottery L itself. A person is locally risk-
averse over range [x′, x′′] if, for any lottery L with support a subset of [x′, x′′], she prefers a
certain payment equal to the expected value of L over the lottery L itself.
Definition: A person is globally risk-seeking if, for any lottery L, she prefers the lottery
L over a certain payment equal to the expected value of L. A person is locally risk-seeking
over range [x′, x′′] if, for any lottery L with support a subset of [x′, x′′], she prefers the lottery
L over a certain payment equal to the expected value of L.
Definition: A person is globally risk-neutral if, for any lottery L, she is indifferent
between the lottery L and a certain payment equal to the expected value of L. A person is
locally risk-neutral over range [x′, x′′] if, for any lottery L with support a subset of [x′, x′′],
she is indifferent between the lottery L and a certain payment equal to the expected value
of L.
Given these definitions, the following results are well known:
Result: Under the EU model, a person is globally risk-averse if and only if u(·) is globally
concave, and she is locally risk-averse over range [x′, x′′] if and only if u(·) is concave over
range [x′, x′′].
Result: Under the EU model, a person is globally risk-seeking if and only if u(·) is
globally convex, and she is locally risk-seeking over range [x′, x′′] if and only if u(·) is convex
over range [x′, x′′].
Result: Under the EU model, a person is globally risk-neutral if and only if u(·) is
globally linear, and she is locally risk-neutral over range [x′, x′′] if and only if u(·) is linear
over range [x′, x′′].
Hence, the EU model is well defined for u(·) with any shape, and indeed is well defined
if the shape of u(·) changes with x. For instance, if u(·) were concave for small x, linear for
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intermediate x, and convex for large x, then the person’s behavior would be risk-averse when
choosing between lotteries that involve only small outcomes, risk-neutral when choosing be-
tween lotteries that involve only intermediate outcomes, and risk-seeking when choosing
between lotteries that involve only large outcomes. Nonetheless, EU was originally intro-
duced to capture the intuition that humans are generally risk-averse, and most applications
of EU assume that u(·) is globally concave. The remainder of our discussion in this section
considers this case.
Figure 1 provides two graphical depictions of indifference curves under EU. Panel A
provides an example of the Marschak-Machina triangle that depicts preferences for three-
outcome lotteries when the three outcomes are fixed and the probabilities vary. Consider
prospects of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, 1 − p1 − p3;x3, p3) with x1 < x2 < x3. Fixing x1, x2,
and x3, all such prospects can be represented in (p1, p3) space. Under EU, indifference curves
in this space have slope
dp3
dp1
∣∣∣∣
U(L)=Ū
=
u(x2)− u(x1)
u(x3)− u(x2)
.
Because the slope is independent of p1 and p3, these indifference curves are linear and parallel.
Moreover, risk aversion is captured in the slope of these indifference curves. If the person is
risk-neutral and thus u(·) is linear, the slope is x2−x1
x3−x2 . In contrast, if the person is risk-averse
and thus u(·) is concave, the slope is steeper than x2−x1
x3−x2 , and a more risk-averse person will
have steeper indifference curves.
Panel B of Figure 1 considers preferences over binary prospects when the probabilities
are fixed and the outcomes vary. Consider prospects of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, 1 − p1).
Fixing p1, all such prospects can be represented in (x1, x2) space. Under EU and assuming
that u(·) is twice differentiable, indifference curves in this space have slope
dx2
dx1
∣∣∣∣
U(L)=Ū
= − p1 u
′(x1)
(1− p1) u′(x2)
.
Here, risk aversion is captured in the shape of these indifference curves. If the person is
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Panel A: EU Indifference Curves in Marschak−Machina Triangle
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Panel B: EU Indifference Curves for Two−Outcome Lotteries
x1
x 2
 EU(L) 
 EV(L) 
●
L
Note: Panel A presents EU indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle for prospects of the form
L = (x1, p1;x2, 1− p1− p3;x3, p3) with x1 < x2 < x3. Panel B presents EU indifference curves for prospects
of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, 1 − p1). Dashed line reflects line of constant expected value (risk neutrality),
which has slope − p11−p1 .
Figure 1: EU Indifference Curves
risk-neutral and thus u(·) is linear, indifference curves are linear with slope − p1
1−p1 . If the
person is risk-averse and thus u(·) is concave, indifference curves are convex, and a more
risk-averse person will have more convex indifference curves.
The two panels in Figure 1 represent benchmarks against which we’ll later compare
models of reference-dependent preferences.
2.3 Some Issues for EU
Having described the EU model, we next describe a series of issues that played a prominent
role in the development of the literature on reference-dependent preferences.
Outcome domain: Our treatment of the EU model above is silent on the domain for
outcomes (i.e., on what the x’s are). When applying EU, it is virtually always assumed that
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the proper domain is to apply EU to final wealth states (or, outside the domain of monetary
gambles, to final consumption bundles). This assumption is often referred to as integration
because it says that the incremental outcomes associated with a chosen prospect must be
integrated with everything else going on in the decision maker’s life.
For monetary gambles, integration is typically implemented by assuming the decision
maker has some prior wealth w and that prospect outcomes are expressed as increments that
are added to or subtracted from that prior wealth to yield a final wealth (to be consumed).
Hence, a prospect L ≡ (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xN , pN) is evaluated according to
U(L) ≡
N∑
n=1
pnu(w + xn).
One reason to assume integration is to make EU a portable model that can be applied in
many domains—from portfolio choice and insurance purchasing to human capital accumu-
lation and gambling—without the need to assume a new utility function in every domain.
A second reason to assume integration is because economists often believe that one’s risk
preferences over incremental prospects are likely to vary with one’s wealth, and in particular
that people become less risk-averse as their wealth goes up. If so, then we must include
one’s initial wealth into the EU calculus. For the remainder of this chapter, we shall assume
integration whenever we discuss EU.
Probabilities : Our treatment of EU above does not specify what the probabilities (the
pn’s) represent. When applying EU, it is typically assumed that if there are objective prob-
abilities known to the decision maker, then those objective probabilities will be used. Oth-
erwise, the decision maker is assumed to formulate a set subjective probabilities that are
then used.3 In fact, empirical applications of EU often combine these approaches along with
an assumption of rational expectations—specifically, by using data to generate an econo-
3When probabilities are subjective, the EU analog is known as subjective expected utility (SEU), with an
analogous utility formulation that is linear in subjective probabilities. For axiomatic developments of SEU,
see Savage (1953, 1954); Anscombe and Aumann (1963).
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metrician’s best estimate for the objective probabilities, and then assuming that a person’s
subjective beliefs correspond to those estimated objective probabilities.
Small-stakes risk neutrality, calibration, and aggregation: Under EU, a person must be
approximately risk-neutral for sufficiently small stakes (see, e.g., Pratt 1964; Arrow 1971;
Segal and Spivak 1990). One manifestation of this fact appears in Panel B of Figure 1: as
indifference curves intersect the 45-degree line of certainty (on which x1 = x2), the slope is
− p1
1−p1 , exactly equal to the slope of the line of constant expected value. A second manifes-
tation appears in attitudes toward positive expected value prospects: if a prospect L has a
positive expected value, then any EU maximizer would always want to take a stake in that
prospect as long as that stake is small enough.
Rabin (2000a) provides a calibration argument indicating that, for any plausible EU
parameters, this approximate risk neutrality must hold even for somewhat larger stakes.
Specifically, he proves that noticeable risk aversion over any set level of stakes implies absurd
risk aversion over stakes only one or two orders of magnitude larger. He provides a series of
striking examples: for instance, if an EU maximizer turns down a 50-50 bet to lose $100 or
gain $110 at all wealth levels, then that person must also turn down any 50-50 bet to lose
$1000 or gain $X for any $X, no matter how large. Intuitively, turning down the small-
stakes bet at wealth w implies significant local curvature of u(·) around w; however, turning
down that same bet over a range of wealth levels implies the same significant local curvature
holds for all w, resulting in massive curvature for larger stakes.
The Rabin critique implies that EU is inconsistent with many plausible patterns of risk
preferences. For instance, consider a person who is indifferent to accepting vs. rejecting
a 50-50 bet to lose $100 or gain $110 for a range of wealths and who is also indifferent
to accepting vs. rejecting a 50-50 bet to lose $1000 or gain $1100 for that same range of
wealths.4 This pattern seems perfectly plausible—and it would certainly seem that we’d
want a theory that would at least permit this pattern as a possibility. However, Rabin’s
4This range need not cover all wealths—e.g., some range [w̄, w̄ + $5000] will do.
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theorem reveals that this pattern is inconsistent with EU.
The implications of small-stakes risk aversion for larger-stakes prospects was also noted
by Samuelson (1963). He starts with an interesting historical anecdote in which he offered
lunch colleagues a simple bet on a fair coin: $200 if the side of their choosing comes up,
−$100 if not. A colleague responded, “I won’t bet because I would feel the $100 loss more
than the $200 gain. But I’ll take you on if you promise to let me make 100 such bets”
(p.2). Samuelson proved that his colleague’s response is inconsistent with EU. Specifically,
he proved that, under EU, if one rejects a prospect, then one must also reject an aggregate
bet in which that prospect is independently played multiple times (as long as the rejection
of the prospect would occur at any wealth level that could obtain in the aggregate bet). The
logic is similar to that of the Rabin critique.
Rabin (2000a) and Samuelson (1963) provide different interpretations for their results.
Samuelson argued that his colleague had a mistaken view of the aggregate bet and wouldn’t
want it if he truly understood it.5 Rabin, in contrast, viewed noticeable but reasonable small-
and moderate-stakes risk aversion as a typical behavior. Indeed, Rabin and Thaler (2001)
argue that the behavior of Samuelson’s colleague is a pattern we might expect many people
to exhibit. One might reject the single bet for exactly the reason Samuelson’s colleague
expressed. At the same time, an aggregate bet made up of 100 independent plays is a quite
attractive bet that offers a tiny chance (0.00044) of losing any money, and a large chance
of earning a significant amount of money—e.g., the probability of winning at least $2000 is
0.982.
Allais’ paradoxes : Allais (1953b) presented two famous “paradoxes”—that is, patterns of
choice inconsistent with EU. Both revolve around violations of the independence axiom and
the corresponding consequence of linearity in probabilities.6 Allais’ more famous paradox—
5Samuelson (1963) emphasizes that, under EU, his colleague should not have wanted to aggregate the
prospect but rather he should have wanted to subdivide the risk, say, into 100 bets of −$1 against $2.
6Interestingly, Allais’ presentation of Allais (1953a) was in the same session as Samuelson’s presentation
of Samuelson (1953) and the day after Savage’s presentation of Savage (1953) at the Colloque Interna-
tionale d’Econométrie in Paris in May of 1952 (Colloques Internationaux du Centre National de la Recherche
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often labeled the “common-consequence paradox”—poses a pair of choices:
Choice 1: A ≡ (100M, 1) vs. B ≡ (500M, .10; 100M, .89; 0, .01).
Choice 2: C ≡ (100M, .11; 0, .89) vs. D ≡ (500M, .10; 0, .90).
When people introspect about these choices, many conclude that they would prefer A over
B and that they would prefer D over C. However, this pattern is inconsistent with EU. In
particular, according to the independence axiom, taking the common consequence of a .89
chance of 1M in A and B and converting it into a common consequence of a .89 chance of
0 to create C and D should not change one’s preference.
Allais’ second paradox—often labeled the “common-ratio paradox”—also poses a pair of
choices:
Choice 1: A ≡ (100M, 1) vs. B ≡ (500M, .98; 0, .02).
Choice 2: C ≡ (100M, .01; 0, .99) vs. D ≡ (500M, .0098; 0, .9902).
Again, when people introspect about these choices, many conclude that they would prefer
A over B and D over C, and again this pattern is inconsistent with EU. The independence
axiom implies that scaling down the likelihood of non-zero amounts by a common ratio
should not change one’s preference—here, the likelihoods of winning 100M and 500M in A
and B are both scaled down by a factor .01 to create C and D.
Moving forward : Behavioral economics has been deeply influenced by the issues high-
lighted by Rabin, Samuelson, and Allais. A major concern is having a model that is consistent
with (i) noticeable and reasonable small- and moderate-stakes risk aversion; (ii) the behavior
of Samuelson’s colleague; and (iii) independence violations à la Allais. Hence, we’ll return
to these phenomena as we develop models of reference-dependent preferences.
Scientifique (Econometrie) 40 1953).
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3 Reference-Dependent Preferences
3.1 Overview and Some History
As the EU model was taking its place as the standard economic approach to decision making
under uncertainty, other researchers started to highlight two types of potential deviations
from EU: those that relate to linearity in probabilities, and those that relate to the utility
function.
In parallel to work in economics by Allais, psychologists began to explore the possibil-
ity that people might hold “subjective probabilities” that need not correspond to objective
probabilities.7 Preston and Baratta (1948) and Edwards (1955) used experiments to study
how subjective probabilities compare to objective probabilities. Later, Edwards (1962) de-
scribed a process by which objective probabilities were replaced by decision weights which
need not respect EU’s linearity requirements.
At the same time, economists were speculating on deviations from a globally concave
utility function defined over final wealth states. Friedman and Savage (1948) pointed to the
existence of decision makers who simultaneously purchase lottery tickets at less than fair odds
and insurance for moderate risks. To explain this behavior, they suggested that the utility
function over final wealth states might have both concave and convex regions. Motivated by
Friedman and Savage (1948), Markowitz (1952) suggested an alternative solution: perhaps
instead of utility being defined over final wealth states, utility is defined over gains and losses
relative to present wealth.8 Based on thought experiments—specifically, how people would
choose between gaining a certain amount $x vs. a one in ten chance of gaining $10x, and
how people would choose between losing a certain amount $x vs. a one in ten chance of
losing $10x—Markowitz hypothesized a pattern of risk seeking followed by risk aversion as
7In this work, the usage of “subjective probability” differs from that among economists in that (i) subjec-
tive probabilities might deviate from objective probabilities even when the latter are known to the decision
maker, and (ii) subjective probabilities are permitted not to sum to one.
8Markowitz (1952) permits that reference wealth might shift if the person has recently experienced a
windfall gain or loss.
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the stakes increased for gains, and the opposite pattern for losses. He further hypothesized
that people dislike symmetric fair bets, and thus suggested that |u(−x)| > u(x).
In their model of “prospect theory,” Kahneman and Tversky (1979) combined and built
upon early thinking on both lines of inquiry. As a first step, they collected data on people’s
responses to hypothetical choice problems, from which they stipulated a set of properties that
choices seemed to satisfy. Much of the data they gathered was inspired by prior work—e.g.,
their paired problems 1 and 2 are a variant of Allais’ common-consequence example, their
paired problems 3 and 4 are a variant of Allais’ common-ratio example, and their various
paired problems x and x′ in the gain vs. loss domain are analogous to Markowitz’s thought
experiments.
Kahneman and Tversky then set out to develop a model that would accommodate all of
these properties. Specifically, they propose that gambles of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, p2; 0, p3)
are evaluated according to
V (L) ≡ π(p1)v(x1) + π(p2)v(x2), (2)
where π(p) represents a probability weighting function that converts objective probabilities
into decision weights, and v(x) is a value function defined over gains and losses (note that
v(0) = 0 is assumed—see below).9
In the years that followed, the literature found promise in exploring both nonlinear prob-
ability weighting and a value function defined over gains and losses, although often inde-
pendently. In particular, gain-loss utility received prominent attention in the behavioral-
economics literature, where research on topics such as small-stakes risk aversion, exchange
behavior, and labor supply drew out the implications of loss aversion. Probability weighting
received prominent attention in the decision-theory literature, where research on EU devi-
9In the original formulation, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) explicitly limit their domain to gambles with
at most two non-zero outcomes, and they also assume a slightly different functional for gambles that are
sure to yield a gain or sure to yield a loss. The primary reason for such restrictions was to eliminate clearly
incorrect predictions due to features of the probability weighting function. Later variants of probability
weighting eliminate the need for such fixes, as we discuss in Section 8.
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ations à l’Allais and other violations of independence were rationalized by models of prob-
ability distortion. The approach of isolating the predictions of one particular phenomenon
(e.g., the predictions of gain-loss utility or the predictions of probability weighting) is quite
common in economics, and we follow the same path here. The remainder of this section
and Sections 4 through 6 will focus on the reference-dependent aspects of the model, while
Section 8 will provide discussion and details on nonlinearity in probabilities.10
3.2 Risky Choice and the Value Function
We begin with a simple model of reference-dependent preferences in the spirit of prospect
theory. Again, consider prospects of the form L ≡ (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xN , pN), and let r be a
reference point around which a person defines gains and losses—i.e., xn > r is a gain while
xn < r is a loss. Prospect L is evaluated according to
V (L|r) ≡
N∑
n=1
pnv(xn − r). (3)
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest that a natural candidate for the reference point,
especially in simple experimental gambles, is one’s initial wealth. Given that the xn’s are
defined as increments to wealth, this implies r = 0 as in equation 2 above. Equation 3
permits other reference points as well, and, as we shall see, the question of what is the
reference point has been a major topic in the literature.11
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argue that the value function, v(·), is an increasing func-
tion with three key features:
10Some research explores probability weighting and gain-loss utility in concert, often by applying directly
the model of cumulative prospect theory developed in Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Several prominent
examples come from the field of finance—see Chapter X of this handbook for a detailed summary of this
work.
11Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognize this issue, as they write:
“So far ... the reference point was taken to be the status quo, or one’s current assets. Although
this is probably true for most choice problems, there are situations in which gains and losses
are coded relative to an expectation or aspiration level that differs from the status quo.”
14
1. Zero value of reference point: v(0) = 0.
2. Diminishing sensitivity: v′′(x) < 0 for x > 0, but v′′(x) > 0 for x < 0.
3. Loss aversion: For x > 0, v(x) < −v(−x) and v′(x) < v′(−x).
The first feature is really just a normalization. The second feature says that people have a
diminishing sensitivity to the magnitude of gains and losses. For gains (x > 0), this property
is analogous to the assumption of diminishing marginal utility for final wealth in EU. For
losses (x < 0), in contrast, to have diminishing sensitivity to marginal losses as losses get
larger is equivalent to the value function being convex in this domain.
The third feature says that, when comparing gains and losses, losses loom larger than
commensurate gains. The assumption of loss aversion has two features: a loss has larger
magnitude utility consequences, and larger marginal utility consequences than an equally
sized gain. Interestingly, while loss aversion has played an especially important role in
the literature, it was the piece of the theory about which Kahneman and Tversky were
least confident (see Kahneman (2000)). Moreover, whereas their exposition merely posits
v(x) < −v(−x) and v′(x) < v′(−x) as above, their Figure 3 further suggests a kink at x = 0.
This kink has been assumed in most of the research that followed.
To illustrate, consider two functional forms that might be used:
Tversky and Kahneman (1992): Two-part linear:
v(x) =
 x
α if x ≥ 0
−λ(−x)β if x ≤ 0
v(x) =
 x if x ≥ 0λx if x ≤ 0
where α, β ∈ (0, 1] and λ ≥ 1 where λ ≥ 1
Figure 2, Panel A depicts the Tversky and Kahneman functional form. This functional
form captures all three properties from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Specifically, the
parameter α captures the degree of diminishing sensitivity in the gain domain (α = 1 implies
no diminishing sensitivity), the parameter β captures the degree of diminishing sensitivity
15
in the loss domain (β = 1 implies no diminishing sensitivity), and the parameter λ captures
the degree of loss aversion when comparing gains to losses (λ = 1 implies no loss aversion).
Panel A: Tversky and Kahneman (1992) Value Function
x
v(
x)
0
0
Panel B: Indifference Curves for Two−Outcome Lotteries
x1
x 2
 EU((1;r)) 
 EU(L) 
r
r
Note: Panel A depicts the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) value function given a reference point r and loss
aversion λ > 1. Dashed line corresponds to formulation with α < 1 and β < 1; solid line corresponds
to formulation with α = β = 1. Panel B presents indifference curves for prospects of the form L =
(x1, p1;x2, 1− p1) when α = β = 1.
Figure 2: Reference-Dependent Preferences
A value function with these properties has important implications for risky choice. Dimin-
ishing sensitivity in the gain domain implies that, when making choices between prospects
where all possible outcomes are (weakly) in the gain domain, the person will be risk-averse.
Intuitively, the structure of equation 3 is identical to equation 1, and thus because the value
function is locally concave in the gain domain, the person will be locally risk-averse in the
gain domain. Analogously, diminishing sensitivity in the loss domain implies that, when
making choices between prospects when all possible outcomes are (weakly) in the loss do-
main, the person will be risk-seeking.12 Importantly, loss aversion is irrelevant to both of
12An often emphasized implication of prospect theory is the “four-fold pattern of risk preferences”: (i)
people are risk-averse over moderate-probability gains, (ii) people are risk-seeking over moderate-probability
losses, (iii) people are risk-loving over small-probability gains, and (iv) people are risk-averse over small-
probability losses. Under prospect theory, (i) and (ii) are driven by diminishing sensitivity in the value
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these implications. Rather, loss aversion becomes relevant only when making choices be-
tween prospects when gains and losses are both possible, and it creates an additional source
of risk aversion for such choices.
Much of the literature that has applied prospect theory has focused on the specific impli-
cations of loss aversion. The two-part-linear functional form assumes there is no diminishing
sensitivity, and thus isolates these implications. In most of our development, we follow
this tradition and focus only on the two-part linear form. In Section 9 we will return to
diminishing sensitivity in our discussion.
Figure 2, Panel B further highlights the implications of the two-part-linear functional
form by presenting its indifference curves in binary lottery (x1, x2) space given an exogenous
reference point r. Consider first the indifference curve through (r, r). Note that this indiffer-
ence curve is kinked at (r, r), implying that, unlike under EU, a loss-averse individual need
not be risk-neutral over infinitesimally small stakes. Next, consider indifference curves to
the right or the left of (r, r). In each case, there are three regions. In the middle region,
where either x1, x2 > r or x1, x2 < r, the slope is equal to − p1(1−p1) and thus the person would
be locally risk-neutral. In contrast, in the region where x1 > r > x2, the slope is equal
to − p1
λ(1−p1) , which is smaller (in magnitude) than
−p1
(1−p1) , reflecting that losses are felt more
severely than commensurate gains. Analogously, in the region where x1 < r < x2, the slope
is equal to − λp1
(1−p1) , which is larger (in magnitude) than
−p1
(1−p1) .
3.3 Riskless Choice
Although prospect theory was initially formulated as a model for decision making under
uncertainty, it was quickly recognized that a reference-dependent value function would have
a number of direct applications for riskless choice (Thaler (1980)). Indeed, many applications
of reference-dependent preferences focus on the riskless evaluation of gains and losses (see
function (as described in the text), while (iii) and (iv) are driven by overweighting of small probabilities in
the probability-weighting functions (as described in Section 8).
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Section 4).
Extending the theory into the domain of riskless choice requires additional modeling
choices.13 First, whereas models of decision making under uncertainty focus on how people
trade off consumption of a single good (money) across different states, models of riskless
choice focus on how people trade off consumption of one good for consumption of another
good. In other words, both consumption and reference points might be multi-dimensional.
Second, the fact that consumption and reference points might be multi-dimensional requires
the researcher to decide how to model sensations of gain and loss across dimensions. Third,
in the domain of riskless choice, it is important to incorporate the intrinsic utility of different
goods—i.e., the utilities that would fully determine behavior of a standard agent.
These modeling exigencies have led to the following formulation of reference dependence
for riskless choice. Suppose a person is choosing between riskless consumption bundles of
the form x ≡ (x1, ..., xN) with reference bundle r ≡ (r1, ...rN), where each xn represents a
different good (e.g., mugs, candy, cars, money) and each rn represents the corresponding
reference point. The decision maker evaluates bundle x according to
U(x|r) ≡ u(x) + v(x|r)
where u(·) represents intrinsic utility and v(·) represents reference-dependent sensations of
gain and loss. While more general approaches are possible, the typical approach assumes
additive separability across goods. In other words, u(x) ≡
∑N
n=1 u
n(xn) where un is an
intrinsic utility function for good n, and v(x|r) ≡
∑N
n=1 v
n(xn|rn) where vn is a gain-loss
utility function for good n.
13Tversky and Kahneman (1991) provide the first formal treatment of gain-loss utility for riskless choice.
Later approaches evolved through specific applications and new theories.
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For vn(xn|rn), Tversky and Kahneman (1991) suggest functional form
vn(xn|rn) ≡
 η
n(xn − rn) if xn ≥ rn
ηnλn(xn − rn) if xn ≤ rn
(4)
where ηn ≥ 0 captures the importance of gain-loss utility relative to intrinsic utility, and
λn ≥ 1 captures the degree of loss aversion.14 Though restricted to be the two-part linear
form, this formulation retains a great degree of flexibility. The magnitude of loss aversion
(λn) is permitted to differ across goods—e.g., when studying the willingness to pay for a
mug, this formulation permits that one could have gain-loss utility over mugs but not over
money. In addition, the overall magnitude of gain-loss utility (ηn) is also permitted to differ
across goods—e.g., one could assume that the gain utility associated with obtaining a mug
is larger than the gain utility associated with obtaining a car. As we’ll see in Section 4,
applications of gain-loss utility have taken advantage of both forms of flexibility.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) restrict this freedom, suggesting instead that
vn(xn|rn) ≡ µ(un(xn)− un(rn)) where µ(z) =
 ηz if z ≥ 0ηλz if z ≤ 0. (5)
This formulation makes two key disciplining assumptions. First, it assumes that gains and
losses are defined in terms of intrinsic utilities—because it assumes that the argument in µ is
the intrinsic-utility difference between consuming xn and consuming the reference point rn.
Second, it assumes a universal gain-loss utility function—in particular, η and λ are the same
for all dimensions of consumption. Together, these assumptions eliminate the flexibility
discussed above.15 The Koszegi-Rabin gain-loss function has the virtue that, relative to
any intrinsic utility function that one might assume in a standard model, there are only
14Tversky and Kahneman (1991) do not include intrinsic utility in their formulation, and thus do not
include ηn. In addition, the λn here is equivalent to the 1/λn in their formulation.
15Most applications of the Koszegi-Rabin utility model assume this two-part-linear functional form for
µ, and thus focus on the implications of loss aversion. However, it would be straightforward to permit
diminishing sensitivity in µ.
19
two additional free parameters, η and λ. Moreover, the model nests the standard model
whenever η = 0 or λ = 1.16
3.4 Editing and Mental Accounting
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) incorporate two stages in the choice process: an editing
stage and an evaluation stage. Everything detailed above refers to the evaluation stage,
which describes how a person makes a choice from a well defined set of prospects. The
editing stage happens prior to the evaluation stage, and reflects how a person converts a
choice problem that is presented to her into a well defined set of prospects from which she
must make a choice (which she’ll then do at the evaluation stage).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggest a large number of operations that might occur in
the editing stage. Some important examples are “coding” (redefining outcomes as gains or
losses), “combination” (combining the probabilities for identical outcomes), “cancellation”
(discarding of shared components), and “detection of dominance” (eliminating dominated
options). In the original theory, the editing stage served two purposes. First, some of
their motivating data could only be explained by people interpreting two arguably identical
problems in different ways (e.g., the isolation-effect example described below). Second,
the evaluation stage generates some “perverse” predictions (especially related to probability
weighting—see Section 8), and they correct for these at the editing stage (e.g., by eliminating
dominated options).
The second purpose is ad hoc, and fortunately subsequent work has made it less necessary.
The first purpose, in contrast, may reflect a real psychology in decision making. In the world,
people are presented with complex choice problems, and before one can apply any type of
evaluative procedure, one must first convert the complex choice problem into a well defined
16With λ = 1, the model reduces to
v(x|r) = u(x) + η(u(x)− u(r)) = (1 + η)u(x)− ηu(r),
a monotone (affine) transform of u(x).
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set of options to evaluate. This mental procedure is often labelled “mental accounting,”
and any investigation of decision making must make a set of assumptions about mental
accounting (such assumptions are sometimes made explicitly, but they are more often made
implicitly). When applying gain-loss utility, there are two key dimensions on which one must
make mental-accounting assumptions: coding and bracketing.
Coding refers to how a person encodes outcomes as gains vs. losses—or, equivalently,
what is the reference point around which gains and losses are defined. To illustrate the im-
portance of coding, consider an example of the isolation effect from Kahneman and Tversky
(1979):
Problem 11: You get 1000 for sure. In addition, choose between (1000, .5)
and (500, 1).
Problem 12: You get 2000 for sure. In addition, choose between (−1000, .5)
and (−500, 1).
Relative to one’s prior wealth, both problems involve a choice between (2000, .5; 1000, .5)
and (1500, 1). However, the majority choose the latter in Problem 11 and the former in
Problem 12.17 Kahneman and Tversky interpret this behavior as people ignoring the shared
statement of getting a fixed amount for sure and focus on the choice between the stated
gambles (i.e., they view Problem 11 as a choice between (1000, .5) and (500, 1), ignoring the
1000 for sure).18 This is equivalent to people using a reference point r = w+1000 in Problem
11 and a reference point r = w + 2000 in Problem 12.
When one applies gain-loss utility in complex economic applications, coding—and in
particular the question of what is the reference point—is an important issue, and is left un-
specified by the model. Kahneman and Tversky note that in some decisions it is appropriate
to use the status quo or current asset levels, whereas in other situations an expectation or
17Markowitz (1952) also discussed paired problems of this type, although he introspected that people
would behave the same in the two problems.
18With this interpretation, the majority behavior in Problems 11 and 12 is then explained by diminishing
sensitivity in the value function.
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an aspiration level might be more appropriate. Without a structured mechanism for de-
termining the reference point, the model benefits from a powerful degree of freedom with
many behaviors across environments potentially accommodated by a suitable definition of
the reference point. As we’ll see, applications often take advantage of this degree of freedom.
Bracketing refers to how a person delineates the set of choices that she faces. As a simple
example, suppose a person is asked to accept or reject a lottery L (or a consumption bundle
x). On one hand, the person could evaluate the two options—accept or reject—in isolation
from all the other choices that she faces in her life (narrow bracketing). On the other hand,
the person could integrate this choice with all the other choices that she faces in her life and
make one grand choice (broad bracketing). Or, the person could do something in between.
A second dimension of bracketing revolves around the question of which options are relevant.
A standard approach would assume that a person considers all options that are available.
However, in complex choice problems, it seems plausible that a person might consider only
a subset of the available options.
It is worth highlighting that many standard economic analyses implicitly assume narrow
bracketing—e.g., any industrial organization analysis that estimates underlying preferences
for an individual good while ignoring all the other goods that people consume is effectively
assuming narrow bracketing. How a person brackets can of course matter in standard eco-
nomic models, but it matters even more in models of gain-loss utility. The sharp sensitivity
of behavior around the reference point may be muted by broader bracketing of outcomes.
Much as for coding, when one applies gain-loss utility in complex economic applications,
bracketing is an important issue left unspecified by the model. While there are a few papers
that focus explicitly on bracketing (e.g., in the domains of labor supply and repeated risks),
the issue of bracketing has been less discussed in the literature than the issue of coding.
Before leaving the topic of mental accounting, it is worth briefly distinguishing the psy-
chological assumption of mental accounting from mere simplifying assumptions. There is a
long tradition in economics of making simplifying assumptions about complex environments
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so as to permit tractable analysis. Typically, this is viewed as a modeling technique, and
not as something that the actual agents would be doing. Mental-accounting assumptions
often appear at first glance merely to be an example of the modeler making simplifying
assumptions. However, the mental-accounting assumptions discussed above are often meant
to reflect psychological assumptions about how the agents themselves think. Given that
assumptions about the choice set can impact predictions, it is worth paying more attention
to whether such assumptions reflect a plausible underlying psychology (in which case they
might be justified) or whether they are really being made for simplicity (in which case we
should worry about bias).
4 Applications With Exogenous Reference Points
The model of reference-dependent preferences in Section 3 applies for static choice with
fixed, exogenous reference points. We now consider applications and evidence based on this
approach.19
Some early applications of reference-dependent preferences pointed to well-known behav-
ioral anomalies and described how such choices could be rationalized by reference-dependent
preferences. One prominent domain for such efforts is simple risk preferences. For instance,
after proving that EU is inconsistent with a person exhibiting noticeable and reasonable
small- and moderate-stakes risk aversion, Rabin (2000a) suggests reference-dependent pref-
erences as a natural explanation. To illustrate, consider a decision maker with a reference
point at current wealth w deciding to accept or reject a 50-50 prospect over −$Y and +$X.
Applying equation 3 with a two-part linear value function, a reference-dependent agent
19For an early summary of field applications of prospect theory—both gain-loss utility and probability
weighting—see Camerer (2000).
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would, for any current wealth, w, accept such a bet if
0.5 · v(X) + 0.5 · v(−Y ) > v(0)
0.5 · (X) + 0.5 · (−λY ) > 0
X > λY.
Hence, an agent with λ = 2, for instance, would, for all values of current wealth w, be
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the following 50-50 bets:
(
−$1, 1
2
; +$2,
1
2
)
,
(
−$10, 1
2
; +$20,
1
2
)
,
(
−$100, 1
2
; +$200,
1
2
)
,
(
−$1000, 1
2
; +$2000,
1
2
)
.
While this pattern of preferences might seem plausible, recall that Rabin (2000a) proved
such preferences are inconsistent with EU. For instance, indifference to
(
−$1, 1
2
; +$2, 1
2
)
for
all current wealths implies starkly diminishing marginal utility to the point where, if the
magnitude of the potential loss is increased only a little (even $4 is enough), the decision
maker would reject any 50-50 bet no matter the potential gain.20 In contrast, the reference-
dependent agent can exhibit noticeable risk aversion over small stakes for all current wealths,
while also exhibiting reasonable risk aversion over larger stakes. As such, Rabin (2000a)
proposes reference dependence as a potential rationalization of noticeable and reasonable
small- and moderate-stakes risk aversion.
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) demonstrate that a similar exercise can be conducted for
the phenomena described by Samuelson (1963). Though Samuelson (1963) described the
decisions of his colleague as an error, it seems quite plausible that many individuals would
20For instance, indifference to (−1, 12 ; +2,
1
2 ) at wealth w implies u(w + 2) − u(w) = u(w) − u(w − 1).
Defining ∆(x) ≡ u(w + x) − u(w + x − 1), this becomes ∆(2) + ∆(1) = ∆(0), and concavity implies
∆(2) < ∆(1) and thus 2∆(2) < ∆(0). Indifference to this bet for all w implies 2∆(x + 2) < ∆(x) for
all x. Now consider bet (−l, 12 ; +g,
1
2 ) with l and g even (for simplicity). The person will accept this bet
only if
∑g
x=1 ∆(x) ≥
∑l
x=1 ∆(1− x). However,
∑g
x=1 ∆(x) <
∑g/2
x=1 2∆(2x− 1) < 2∆(1)
∑g/2
x=1
(
1
2
)x−1
and∑l
x=1 ∆(1 − x) >
∑l/2
x=1 2∆(2 − 2x) > 2∆(0)
∑l/2
x=1 (2)
x−1
. Hence, even for only l = 4,
∑l
x=1 ∆(1 − x) >
6∆(0), and since limg→∞
∑g
x=1 ∆(x) < 4∆(1), the person would reject the bet no matter how large g is.
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reject a 50-50 prospect over −$100 and +$200, but accept multiple repetitions thereof.
While such behavior is inconsistent with EU, it arises naturally under reference dependence.
A reference-dependent decision maker would reject the single prospect if
v(0) > 0.5 · v(−100) + 0.5 · v(200)
or λ > 2.
This same decision maker would accept two independent repetitions provided
v(0) < 0.25 · v(−200) + 0.5 · v(100) + 0.25 · v(400)
or λ < 3.
For λ ∈ (2, 3), the decision maker rejects the single prospect and accepts the combined
prospect. The key intuition is that a reference-dependent person is particularly influenced
by losses, and as the bet is aggregated, the probability of a loss gets smaller and smaller.
As highlighted by Benartzi and Thaler, this application requires a bracketing assumption
that the two independent repetitions are treated as a single prospect. If instead the two inde-
pendent repetitions are treated as two separate decisions whether to take the single prospect,
the person would still reject them. In fact, an experimental literature has directly tested
the impact of this type of bracketing. Experimental subjects regularly show a substantially
greater willingness to accept Samuelson-style bets when explicitly bracketed together than
when explicitly bracketed separately (Gneezy and Potters 1997; Bellemare et al. 2005; Haigh
and List 2005).
While rationalizations of these well-known behavioral anomalies are valuable, they do not
constitute true tests of reference-dependent preferences because these anomalies were, at least
partially, desiderata in the construction of these preferences. We next turn to applications
that are focused on novel predictions of the model.
Readers will note that the literature and this chapter focus a great deal of attention on
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two domains: the endowment effect and daily labor supply. This focus does not reflect a view
that these domains are particularly important. Rather, it reflects that these domains permit
sharp tests of model predictions, thereby providing a solid foundation and yielding insights
that can be applied broadly. Indeed, as we will also see, reference-dependent preferences
have been usefully applied in a number of arguably more important domains.
4.1 Endowment Effect
Perhaps the most-prominent early example ascribed to loss aversion is the “endowment
effect,” the frequent finding in both experimental and survey research that the willingness to
pay to obtain a good (WTP) is significantly lower than the willingness to accept to give up
that the same good (WTA). The term was coined by Thaler (1980) based on the following
anecdote:
Mr. R bought a case of good wine in the late ’50’s for about $5 a bottle. A few
years later his wine merchant offered to buy the wine back for $100 a bottle. He
refused, although he has never paid more than $35 for a bottle of wine.
That Mr. R’s WTA (which is at least $100) should so substantially exceed his WTP
(which is at most $35) strains the standard model. Apart from wealth effects—i.e., that
owning the bottle makes him wealthier and thus willing to pay more for objects—the two
values should coincide. Thaler (1980) argued that loss aversion provides a natural interpre-
tation for such differences, both because the loss associated with giving up a bottle of wine is
larger than the gain associated with obtaining the same bottle of wine, and because the loss
associated with spending money to buy a bottle of wine is larger than the gain associated
with obtaining money when selling a bottle of wine.
A few years later, Thaler and coauthors pursued experimental demonstrations of the
endowment effect (Knetsch (1989), Kahneman et al. (1990), Kahneman et al. (1992)). The
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body of evidence on endowment effects takes two prominent forms: choice from valuation
tasks and choice from exchange tasks.
In valuation tasks, the goal is to elicit a monetary valuation for an item (such tasks
are most similar to Thaler’s wine-bottle anecdote). The focus has been on three groups of
subjects:
• Buyers are not endowed with the item, and their WTP is elicited.
• Sellers are endowed with the item, and their WTA is elicited.
• Choosers are not endowed with the item, and asked whether they would prefer to obtain
an amount of money or the item. A chooser’s valuation is labelled the equivalent gain
(EG).
Kahneman et al. (1990) elicited valuations from buyers and sellers for mugs and pens,
and found (consistent with Thaler’s anecdote) that the WTA was significantly larger than
the WTP, typically two or three times larger. To control for wealth effects, they also elicited
valuations for choosers—there is no wealth difference between sellers and choosers. They
found that the WTA was also significantly larger than the EG, which was only a little
larger than the WTP. There were numerous replications and extensions in the years which
followed, and this pattern frequently emerges in valuation tasks (Horowitz and McConnell
(2002) provide a survey of 50 studies and find a median ratio of mean WTA to mean WTP
of 2.6).
In exchange tasks, all subjects face a choice between item A and item B, but subjects
differ in their endowment. Group A is endowed with item A and given the opportunity
to exchange it for item B. Group B is endowed with item B and given the opportunity
to exchange it for item A. Group C is not endowed with either item, and merely chooses
between the two items. Note that, in such exchange tasks, there is no difference in wealth
across subjects. Knetsch (1989) ran this paradigm with all three groups choosing between a
mug and a chocolate bar, and found that group A was most likely to choose item A, group
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B was least likely to choose item A, and group C was in the middle. This pattern frequently
emerges in exchange tasks.
It is instructive to develop a model of the loss-aversion account of the endowment effect
(we expand on this model in Section 6.1 when we discuss the more recent endowment-effect
literature in detail). Suppose there are two goods, good M and good P , and consumption
is a bundle (xM , xP ). A person with reference bundle (rM , rP ) makes choices to maximize
utility
U((xM , xP )|(rM , rP )) ≡ vMxM + vPxP + µ(vMxM − vMrM) + µ(vPxP − vP rP )
where vM and vP reflect the intrinsic marginal utility from goods M and P , and µ is a
universal gain-loss utility function as in equation 5.
Consider a valuation task for a mug. Let xM ∈ {0, 1} denote mug consumption, so vM
is the intrinsic value of a mug. Let xP ∈ R denote money spent or received during the
experiment, and assume vP = 1 (reflecting quasi-linear utility).
21 The valuations of the
three types can be derived as follows:
• Sellers have reference points rM = 1 and rP = 0, and thus sell the mug when
U((1, 0)|(1, 0)) ≤ U((0, xP )|(1, 0))
vM ≤ xP − ηλvM + ηxP ⇔ xP ≥
1 + ηλ
1 + η
vM ≡ WTA.
• Buyers have reference points rM = 0 and rP = 0, and thus buy a mug when
U((0, 0)|(0, 0)) ≤ U((1,−xP )|(0, 0)) =
0 ≤ vM − xP + ηvM − ηλxP ⇔ xP ≤
1 + η
1 + ηλ
vM ≡ WTP.
21Given linear intrinsic utility for money, without loss of generality we can set prior wealth equal to zero.
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• Choosers have reference points rM = 0 and rP = 0, and thus choose a mug when
U((1, 0)|(0, 0)) ≥ U((0, xP )|(0, 0))
vM + ηvM ≥ xP + ηxP ⇔ xP ≤ vM ≡ EG.
In this model, loss aversion over mugs implies WTA > EG, and loss aversion over money
implies EG > WTP . Hence, much as Thaler (1980) intuited, there are two reasons why
WTA > WTP . Moreover, because we have assumed a universal gain-loss utility function,
the model predicts WTA/EG = EG/WTP . The fact that early experiments typically found
WTA/EG > EG/WTP was taken as evidence that loss aversion over a good is significantly
larger than loss aversion over money, and indeed the fact that EG is close to WTP was
taken as evidence that there might be no loss aversion over money (see discussion in Tversky
and Kahneman (1991)).
Next consider an exchange task of a mug vs. a pen. Again let xM ∈ {0, 1} denote
mug consumption, but now let xP ∈ {0, 1} denote pen consumption, so vM and vP are the
intrinsic values of a mug and a pen. The behavior of the different groups can be derived as
follows:
• People endowed with a pen have reference points rM = 0 and rP = 1, and thus choose
pen when
U((0, 1)|(0, 1)) ≥ U((1, 0)|(0, 1))
vP ≥ vM + ηvM − ηλvP ⇔ vP ≥
1 + η
1 + ηλ
vM .
• People endowed with a mug have reference points rM = 1 and rP = 0, and thus choose
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pen when
U((0, 1)|(1, 0)) ≥ U((1, 0)|(1, 0))
vP − ηλvM + ηvP ≥ vM ⇔ vP ≥
1 + ηλ
1 + η
vM .
• People not endowed with either item have reference points rM = 0 and rP = 0, and
thus choose pen when
U((0, 1)|(0, 0)) ≥ U((1, 0)|(0, 0))
vP + ηvP ≥ vM + ηvM ⇔ vP ≥ vM .
Because λ > 1 implies 1+η
1+ηλ
vM < vM <
1+ηλ
1+η
vM , loss aversion implies that people endowed
with a pen have the lowest cutoff and thus are most likely to choose pens, and people endowed
with a mug have the highest cutoff and thus are least likely to choose pens. Hence, this model
cleanly illustrates the loss-aversion account for endowment effects in exchange tasks.
While valuation tasks and exchange tasks are often viewed as distinct, they are both
ways of asking people to choose between two goods while varying their endowments. Indeed,
the model is much the same whether the second good is money or pens, as is clear from the
inequalities above for the two cases. In practice, the main difference is that money is more
divisible, and thus valuation tasks reveal finer grained deviations from the standard model
with greater statistical precision.
Though WTP -WTA disparities in valuation experiments and exchange asymmetries in
exchange experiments are widely documented, an important body of research over the past
15-20 years has questioned the usual loss-aversion interpretation reflected above. In Section
6.1, we describe this debate in detail.
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4.2 Labor Supply
A second prominent early example revolved around workers who choose their labor supply
on a daily basis—such as taxi drivers—and the possibility that they might be using a daily
income target. More precisely, the hypothesis is that workers are bracketing their labor-
supply decisions at the daily level, and on each day they experience reference-dependent
gain-loss utility depending on how that day’s earnings compare to some reference point
(target earnings).
We begin with a simple model of this domain (framed in a way that can also be applied
to other domains later). Consider a worker choosing an effort level e that generates cost c(e)
that is increasing and (weakly) convex. Effort level e also generates an observable outcome,
x(e), that is increasing and (weakly) concave. Letting u(x(e)) denote the intrinsic utility
associated with x(e), a standard agent would choose e to maximize u(x(e))− c(e). In what
follows, we assume for simplicity that intrinsic utility is linear.22 Hence, a standard agent
would choose e to maximize x(e)− c(e), yielding e∗ such that
MB(e∗) ≡ x′(e∗) = c′(e∗) ≡MC(e∗).
In the domain of daily labor supply, e can be interpreted as the number of hours worked.
Given an hourly wage w, x(e) = we. Standard agents, then, merely choose effort such that
c′(e∗) = w, and, given that c is convex, a drop in the wage leads to a drop in labor supply.23
Consider instead an agent who experiences gain-loss utility based on how x(e) compares
to some exogenous reference point rx. Applying µ as in equation 5, this agent chooses e to
maximize
U(e) ≡ x(e) + µ(x(e)− rx)− c(e).
22Models of this form would typically assume either that x is linear and c is convex or that c is linear and
x is concave, depending on the interpretations of x and c.
23The assumption that intrinsic utility is linear corresponds to an assumption that any standard income
effect associated with earnings on a single day are negligible.
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Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the agent experiences no gains and losses associated
with the cost of effort, c(e). As such, marginal costs remain MC(e) = c′(e), while marginal
benefits become
MB(e) =
 (1 + η)x
′(e) if x(e) > rx
(1 + ηλ)x′(e) if x(e) < rx.
Hence, marginal benefits drop discontinuously at rx.
Figure 3 depicts marginal benefits and marginal costs for a reference-dependent agent.
Consider first the dark boldfaced marginal benefit curve labeled MB1(e, rx)λ>1 which is
associated with benefit function x1(e) = w1e. At low effort levels, the person has earned
less than her target, and thus has high marginal benefit (1 + ηλ)w1. At high effort levels,
the person has earned more than her target, and thus has low marginal benefit (1 + η)w1.
At effort level e such that x1(e) = rx, which in the labor supply domain is e
r
1 = rx/w1,
the marginal benefit discontinuously drops. Figure 3 presents marginal cost curves for six
different people (who have the same income target). We see that person 1 chooses not to
make it to the target, persons 2 and 3 choose to work until they exactly hit the target, and
persons 4, 5, and 6 work so as to make more than the target.
The key comparative static in the early labor-supply literature is how do people react to
a change in the daily wage. In Figure 3, the light boldfaced marginal benefit curve labeled
MB2(e, rx)λ>1 reflects what the benefit curve would look like for daily wage w2 < w1. This
drop in the wage increases the location of the discontinuity to er2 = rx/w2, and it also
decreases the marginal benefit on either side of the discontinuity. Whereas standard agents
would react to a wage decrease by simply reducing their labor supply, reference-dependent
workers have a more mixed response. For some marginal cost curves, workers will show the
expected response of reducing their labor supply (persons 1, 2, 5, and 6). For other marginal
cost curves, however, workers react to a lower wage by increasing labor supply (persons 3 and
4). The intuition is simple: for e ∈ (er1, er2), the lower wage actually increases the marginal
benefit of effort because this range of effort is now in the loss domain.
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Note: Figure presents marginal benefit and cost of effort. Solid black line MB1(e, rx)λ>1 reflects marginal
benefit for a loss-averse agent who faces wage w1. Solid gray line MB2(e, rx)λ>1 reflects marginal benefit
for a loss-averse agent who faces wage w2< w1. Dashed gray line MB1(e, rx)λ=1 reflects marginal benefit
for an agent who has no loss aversion and who faces wage w1. MC1(e), MC2(e), ...,and MC6(e) reflect
marginal costs for agents 1, 2, ..., and 6.
Figure 3: Reference Dependence and Effort Provision
The early literature on daily labor supply focused on this anomalous possibility that loss
aversion could possibly lead to negative wage elasticities. The seminal paper by Camerer et
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al. (1997) studies behavior of New York City cab drivers. They first analyze hourly wages
(hourly earnings) for drivers, and conclude that hourly wages are highly correlated within
a day and relatively uncorrelated across days. Based on this preliminary finding, they take
their unit of observation to be a day, and estimate a standard daily wage equation of the
form
lnHt = γWt + βXt + εt
where Ht is hours worked on day t, and Wt is the daily wage on day t (derived as driver-
specific daily earnings divided by the hours worked). Using three different datasets and
multiple specifications, Camerer et al. (1997) consistently find evidence of negative wage
elasticities—inconsistent with a standard model but consistent with daily income targeting.
The specification of Camerer et al. (1997) suffers from a potential division bias because
wages are constructed by dividing daily earnings by hours. Though they attempt to control
for this bias with an instrumental-variables approach, the conclusions may be challenged by
the lack of exogenous variation in wages. In a prominent follow-up study, Fehr and Goette
(2007) implement exogenous (experimental) variation in wages for bicycle messengers. They
find that higher wages lead bicycle messengers to choose to work more shifts, but also to earn
less per shift (on net, total earnings increased). Fehr and Goette also conduct experiments to
elicit loss aversion for a sample of the bicycle messengers, and find that the negative treatment
effect on shift earnings is predicted by their experimental measures of loss aversion. Taken
together, these results suggest a model in which loss aversion does not have much impact
on the extensive margin of whether to work on a given day, but does impact the intensive
margin of how long or how hard to work once one has shown up.24
The initial work on taxi drivers spurred a number of additional studies in that domain,
along with a substantial discussion between labor and behavioral economists. In Section 6.2,
we revisit the topic of labor supply and discuss this debate in detail.
24The extensive margin finding is echoed by Oettinger (1999) who analyzes stadium vendors over the
course of a baseball season. Consistent with the findings of Fehr and Goette (2007) and standard labor-
supply models, he shows that vendors are more likely to work when the predictable earnings are larger.
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4.3 Other Forms of Effort Provision
The model of effort provision in Section 4.2 can also be applied to other domains. Here we
describe three applications that study effort to reduce one’s income taxes due, to run faster
in a marathon, and to make a putt in professional golf.
Figure 3 highlights two additional implications of reference dependence in the domain of
effort provision. First, we should observe bunching at the reference point. As a benchmark,
consider the light dashed marginal benefit curve labeled MB1(e, rx)λ=1, which reflects what
the marginal benefit curve would look like for a standard agent. For standard agents, if people
differ in only their marginal cost curves, each type would choose a different effort level, and
we should thus observe a population distribution of outcomes that roughly corresponds to
the population distribution of marginal cost curves. In contrast, for reference-dependent
agents who face the dark boldfaced MB1(e, rx)λ>1, we should observe a bunching of agents
at er1 (e.g., persons 2 and 3 in the figure). Second, we should observe differential behavior
on either side of the reference point, and in particular we should see people exert additional
effort when they are in the loss domain. For instance, if the reference point were to move far
to the left so as to put person 1 well above the reference point, there would be a significant
reduction in her effort.
Rees-Jones (2018) identifies both implications—bunching and differential behavior—in
the domain of income-tax preparation. He conceptualizes people as putting together initial
tax information to formulate an initial balance due, and then deciding how much extra
effort to exert to identify additional deductions and credits. He posits that, when people
make these decisions, it is natural to use a reference point of a zero balance due. If so,
then loss aversion implies that we should observe bunching of final balance due at zero, and
moreover we should observe more additional deductions and credits for people whose final
balance due is positive (in the loss domain) than we do for people whose final balance due is
negative (in the gain domain). Using IRS data from 1979-1990, Rees-Jones (2018) estimates
a model using both of these implications. The raw data show clear signs of bunching in the
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neighborhood of zero balance due, and his estimates suggest that, on average, people pursue
an additional $34 of tax reduction when they owe money relative to when they are receiving
a refund.
Allen et al. (2017) investigate bunching behavior in the domain of marathon running.
They posit that marathon runners have reference points of round-number finishing times—
e.g., finishing in better than 4 hours (4:00:00), or better than 3.5 hours (3:30:00). Using
data covering 9,789,093 finishing times from 6,888 marathons run over the period 1970-
2013, they find clear evidence of bunching at finishing times just better than various salient
round numbers. Indeed, a simple glance at their raw data (in their Figure 2) reveals striking
evidence of bunching. The most extreme bunching occurs in the minutes just before 4:00:00—
300,324 finishing times fall in the interval 3:57:00-3:59:59, whereas only 212,477 finishing
times fall in the interval 4:00:00-4:02:59. Their analysis finds statistically significant bunching
around most other 10-minute marks as well.
Pope and Schweitzer (2011) investigate differential behavior on either side of the reference
point in the domain of professional (PGA Tour) golf. In most professional golf tournaments,
players play 72 holes, and the order of finish—and hence earnings—is entirely determined
by the total number of shots taken over those 72 holes (with the lowest total being the
best). In addition, each individual hole has a suggested score (“par”). For standard agents,
because this suggested score is completely irrelevant to the order of finish and earnings
in the tournament, it should be irrelevant to their effort. Pope and Schweitzer posit that
professional golfers experience gain-loss utility on each hole, with par serving as a natural
reference point. Applying the model above, we would predict different behavior on either
side of the reference point—e.g., one should expect more effort and thus a higher proportion
of putts made when one is putting for par (when trying to avoid a loss) than when one
is putting for birdie (when one is trying to achieve a gain). Pope and Schweitzer analyze
data from 239 PGA Tour tournaments completed between 2004 and 2009, focusing on all
golfers who attempted at least 1000 putts—yielding data on 421 golfers and over 2.5 million
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putts. The data also contain the exact locations of the ball and the hole. Controlling for the
distance of the putt, they indeed find that on average golfers are about 2 percentage points
more likely to make a par putt than they are to make a birdie putt.
4.4 Finance
A robust literature has applied prospect theory to finance, and this literature has in fact
highlighted the implications of all three of the main components of prospect theory: loss
aversion (as highlighted in the non-finance applications above), diminishing sensitivity, and
probability weighting. For a detailed coverage, see Chapter X in this volume. Here we focus
on three examples that apply gain-loss utility.
One prominent example is the “equity premium puzzle,” the well known finding that the
observed premium that equity pays relative to bonds is too large to be consistent with EU
and plausible levels of risk aversion (Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
suggest reference-dependent loss aversion as a potential explanation (although there exist
other explanations as well). The basic mechanism proposed by Benartzi and Thaler (1995)
is that, with some regularity (perhaps each year), people look at their financial-portfolio
statement and experience gain utility if their portfolio has gone up in value since the prior
statement, and loss utility if it has gone down. If people’s expectations of such feelings impact
their portfolio allocation, and if losses loom larger than gains, then this utility associated
with paper gains and losses will lead to increased risk-aversion in portfolio choice. Barberis
et al. (2001) further develop this hypothesis in a formal asset-pricing model.
A second prominent example is the “disposition effect,” the tendency of retail investors
to be more prone to sell their winners than their losers. Odean (1998) documents this
tendency in a sample of retail investors, and further demonstrates that their behavior is
inconsistent with several standard explanations. This behavior is often interpreted as being
due to a “realization utility” wherein traders experience gain-loss utility associated with
whether realized capital gains are positive or negative (Barberis and Xiong (2012)).
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Realization utility—even if it is linear and thus doesn’t involve loss aversion—combined
with discounting can generate a disposition effect. For instance, suppose a person is deciding
whether to sell a winner vs. a loser today (e.g., because she needs liquidity). If she sells
the winner, she experiences a gain now instead of in the future; if she sells the loser, she
experiences a loss now instead of in the future. Without discounting, there is no reason
to prefer one vs. the other. With discounting, however, this realization utility creates a
preference to sell the winner, both to accelerate the gain and to delay the loss. Again, this
effect does not require loss aversion. That said, loss aversion can magnify the effect because
the negative feeling of loss would then be even more aversive and thus there would be a
stronger incentive to delay it.
Even if there is no discounting, realization utility can also generate a disposition ef-
fect when combined with diminishing sensitivity. Again, consider a person who is deciding
whether to sell a winner vs. a loser today. Ceteris paribus, the former involves comparing a
sure gain today versus an uncertain gain in the future, whereas the latter involves compar-
ing a sure loss today versus an uncertain loss in the future. Because diminishing sensitivity
creates risk aversion for gains and risk seeking for losses, it encourages the person to sell the
winner and hold the loser.
A third example is evidence from Genesove and Mayer (2001) that can be interpreted as
reflecting a disposition effect in housing markets. Housing markets are much more compli-
cated than stock markets. In the latter, a seller faces a decision whether to sell at a known
market price, and the transaction can take place relatively quickly. In housing markets, a
seller must first set a list price and then wait for offers, where the choice of list price is likely
to impact the frequency with which offers come in as well as the nature of those offers. Once
an offer comes in, frequently there is a period a negotiation, and eventually there is a sale at
a transaction price that need not be the same as either the original list price or the initial
offer price.
Within this domain, realization utility combined with either discounting or diminishing
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sensitivity will make sellers subject to a loss less willing to sell than sellers subject to a gain.
The primary prediction of this mechanism is that sellers will set higher list prices when they
are subject to a loss than when they are subject to a gain. A secondary prediction is that
sellers will have larger thresholds when deciding whether to accept offers.25
Genesove and Mayer (2001) use data from the Boston condominium market in the 1990’s.
Because this market experienced rising prices over 1982-1989, falling prices over 1989-1992,
and then rising prices again over 1992-1997, they observe sellers selling similar houses under
similar market conditions but who purchased their houses at different prices. Hence, they
can investigate the extent to which seller behavior depends on whether they are subject to
a gain or a loss.26 Because list prices are observable in the data, it is possible to conduct a
direct test of the primary prediction above. Genesove and Mayer indeed find that, relative to
sellers who are subject to an expected nominal gain, sellers who are subject to an expected
nominal loss set higher list prices. Additionally, higher expected losses are associated with
higher list prices. For the secondary prediction, a more indirect test is required, specifically
testing whether sellers who are subject to a loss also experience larger final transaction prices
and longer time to sale. Genesove and Mayer also find evidence of both.27
4.5 Coding and Bracketing in Applications
As we leave these applications, it is important to reiterate the importance of coding and
bracketing.
On the former, note that these applications use a wide range of reference points: one’s
25A possible third prediction is bunching of transaction prices on the prior purchase price. However,
whether a model of reference-dependent realization utility would generate such a prediction would depend
upon how one models the details of how offers are generated and how negotiations evolve.
26A major part of the analysis revolves around defining what it means for a seller to be subject to a gain
or a loss. To determine whether a seller is likely to be experiencing a gain or a loss relative to the purchase
price, they estimate a predicted sales price and compare it to the purchase price. The predicted sales price is
generated from hedonic price regressions that control for various features of the house, although they must
also deal with the bias created by unobserved quality. See the paper for details.
27Although Genesove and Mayer (2001) argue that their empirical findings are due to loss aversion, they
might better be attributed to realization utility combined with either discounting or diminishing sensitivity
(although loss aversion might enhance the magnitude).
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prior wealth, one’s initial endowment of a mug or pen, one’s daily target for labor earnings,
the salient benchmark of a zero balance due on taxes, salient round numbers for marathon
finishing times, a suggested score (par) on a golf hole, a prior value of one’s portfolio, and
the price at which an asset is purchased. The choice of reference point represents a powerful
degree of freedom when one takes reference-dependent preferences to applications. Recently,
interest has turned to disciplining the model with structured mechanisms for the formulation
of reference dependence (as we’ll see in the next section).
These applications similarly make a range of bracketing assumptions. For instance, indi-
viduals are assumed to treat an aggregate bet as one grand bet, to treat each day’s labor-
market decision as independent from other days, and to treat each golf hole separately. As
such, tests of reference dependence in these settings should be properly recognized as tests
of joint hypotheses related to loss aversion and correct formulation of the bracket.
5 Expectations-Based Models
5.1 Overview and Some History
Reference dependence around an appropriately defined exogenous reference point has proven
a useful model for explaining a variety of behavior. From risky choice, to financial behavior,
to labor supply, the model provides a coherent account of decision making. At various times,
however, researchers have taken a different approach to gain-loss utility wherein gains and
losses are defined relative to an expectations-based referent.28
The first work in this direction was carried out by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden
(1986) under the label “disappointment aversion” (DA). They posit that as one considers
a lottery, one forms a prior expectation of its outcome, and then, when the uncertainty is
28We make use of the terms “reference point” and “referent” in this chapter to describe the locations
around which gains and losses are defined. The term “referent” is less frequently used in the literature, but
is often helpful terminology when there is a distribution of possible reference points to emphasize that the
referent is not a single point.
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resolved, one experiences elation or disappointment depending on how the realized outcome
compares to that prior expectation. While this intuition is clearly quite similar to the loss-
aversion intuition from prospect theory, this work focused more on anomalies à la Allais and
subsequently did not receive much attention in the early behavioral economics literature.29
Roughly two decades later, Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) (KR) proposed a model with
an expectations-based referent that was motivated by a desire to impose some discipline on
models of reference dependence. Koszegi and Rabin realized that if one uses an expectations-
based referent combined with an assumption that expectations must be rational, the model’s
flexibility is dramatically reduced. It turns out that the KR model shares some features with
DA models.
When working with an expectations-based referent, there are two key modeling ques-
tions that one must address. First, given that expectations will likely involve uncertainty,
how should one incorporate this uncertainty into the referent? Second, what determines
expectations? We examine these two questions in the next two subsections, highlighting key
differences between the DA and KR formulations.
5.2 Formulation of the Expectations-Based Referent
The premise of an expectations-based approach is that the referent depends on one’s ex-
pectations over outcomes. Because expectations will typically involve uncertainty, we need
to develop a model in which the referent is a lottery rather than an outcome. We again
consider prospects of the form L ≡ (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xN , pN) over N potential outcomes
with
∑N
n=1 pn = 1. However, we now assume a person has a reference lottery of the form
R = (r1, q1; r2, q2; ...; rM , qM) over M potential reference outcomes with
∑M
m=1 qm = 1. Given
29Rabin (1998) and Camerer and Loewenstein (2003), two prominent early overviews of behavioral eco-
nomics, do not discuss or cite models of disappointment aversion.
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a reference lottery R, the person evaluates lottery L according to
U(L|R) ≡
N∑
n=1
pn [u(xn) + v(xn|R)]
where u(xn) denotes the intrinsic utility from outcome xn, and v(xn|R) denotes the gain-loss
utility associated with getting outcome xn given a reference lottery R.
30
The literature has pursued two approaches to model v(xn|R). Models of disappointment
aversion (Bell 1985; Loomes and Sugden 1986) assume that xn is compared to a single
summary statistic from the reference lottery R. Specifically, such models assume:
DA Approach: v(xn|R) ≡ µ
(
u(xn)−
(
M∑
m=1
qmu(xm)
))
. (6)
If u(x) = x, then xn is compared to the mean of R. More generally, the intrinsic utility from
xn is compared to the expected intrinsic utility from the reference lottery.
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KR propose an alternative approach in which xn is compared to every outcome that
might have occurred in the reference lottery R. Specifically, they assume:
KR Approach: v(xn|R) ≡
M∑
m=1
qmµ (u(xn)− u(xm)) . (7)
Hence, if xn is larger than some xm in R but smaller than other xm in R, it will be experienced
as a gain relative to the former and a loss relative to the latter. With this formulation,
KR assume that, when the person aggregates these feelings of gains and losses across all
comparisons, the person uses weights that correspond to the probabilities in R.
30Our treatment here develops gain-loss utility with an expectations-based referent for the case where
each xn is a scalar—that is, the case where there is one dimension of consumption. If there are multiple
dimensions of consumption, it is straightforward to extend the analysis here if one further assumes additive
separability across dimensions (as in Section 3.3 and 5.4).
31In his main example, Bell (1985) assumes µ takes a form analogous to the two-part linear value function
discussed in Section 3.2 with losses (disappointment) looming larger than gains (elation). In contrast, Loomes
and Sugden (1986) assume that µ is symmetric around zero (no loss aversion), convex over gains, and concave
over losses—i.e., a form that is quite different from the value function proposed by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979).
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These two approaches reflect different psychologies for how people experience sensations
of gain and loss. Moreover, they also generate different predictions. Perhaps most notably,
consider what happens when there is increased risk in the reference lottery that does not
impact the expected utility of the reference lottery. Under the DA approach, such increased
risk in the reference lottery has no impact on behavior. In contrast, under the KR approach,
such increased risk in the reference lottery actually makes the person more willing to bear
risk—a kind of endowment effect for risk.32
——————————————————————–
Example 1: Consider a choice between L1 ≡ (z + γ, 12 ;−z,
1
2
) vs. L2 ≡ (0, 1),
where z > 0 and γ ≥ 0. The reference lottery is R ≡ (φ, 1
2
;−φ, 1
2
) where φ ∈ [0, z].
• Under the DA approach reflected in equation 6:
U(L1|R) =
1
2
(1 + η)γ − 1
2
η(λ− 1)z
U(L2|R) = 0
⇐⇒ choose L1 if γ >
η(λ− 1)z
1 + η
.
• Under the KR approach reflected in equation 7:
U(L1|R) =
1
2
(1 + η)γ − 1
2
η(λ− 1)z
U(L2|R) = −
1
2
η(λ− 1)φ
⇐⇒ choose L1 if γ >
η(λ− 1)(z − φ)
1 + η
.
——————————————————————–
32While, for completeness, the presentation above permits u(x) to be non-linear, Example 1 and all
subsequent examples assume u(x) = x.
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In Example 1, the person must choose whether to accept or reject a 50-50 gamble with a
(weakly) positive expected value. Under the DA approach, gain-loss utility around ER = 0
creates risk aversion, and thus the expected value of the gamble (as captured by γ) must be
sufficiently large for the person to take the gamble. The amount of risk in R (as captured
by φ) does not impact behavior because it does not change ER. Under the KR approach,
gain-loss utility again creates risk aversion. Notice, however, that the more risk there is
in R (the larger is φ), the smaller need be the expected value of the gamble. Indeed, for
φ = z, the person becomes risk-neutral and accepts L1 for any γ > 0. Intuitively, under the
disappointment-aversion approach, L2 has a major advantage over L1 because it involves no
gain-loss utility. Under the KR approach, in contrast, L2 loses this advantage, because even
the certain outcome generates gain-loss utility relative to the outcomes in R that could have
occurred.
Sprenger (2015) provides a test of DA preferences vs. KR preferences by investigating
whether people in fact exhibit an endowment effect for risk. The design is based on an
assumed framing effect: that when subjects are presented with a series of binary choices
in which one option is fixed and the other varies in a way clearly designed to identify an
indifference point, the fixed option will be used as a referent. Hence, one group of subjects is
presented tasks with a fixed certain amount and asked to choose an equivalent gamble, while
a second group is presented tasks with a fixed gamble and asked to choose an equivalent
certain amount. The results support KR preferences: subjects given a fixed certain amount
are around 75% more likely to exhibit risk aversion and 30% less likely to exhibit risk
neutrality than subjects given a fixed gamble.33
33Sprenger (2015) also documents the same phenomena within-subjects. Fixing a choice between $10 for
sure and a 50-50 gamble over $0 and $30, if the $10 is fixed 54% of subjects prefer the $10 while if the 50-50
gamble is fixed only 32% prefer the $10.
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5.3 What Determines Expectations?
Equations 6 and 7 provide models of gain-loss utility for any expectations-based referent (i.e.,
for any reference lottery R). One must next make assumptions regarding what determines
expectations. Two approaches appear in the literature. First, we might take expectations
to be exogenous (to the current choice), much as is done in the applications in Section
4. Second, we might take expectations to be endogenous to the current choice. One such
approach might permit a person to “choose” the expectations that she’d like as part of the
choice problem. This approach, however, is not entirely satisfactory as it seems unlikely a
person could really come to hold expectations that differ dramatically from what is actually
likely to occur. Moreover, permitting “choice” in one’s beliefs introduces another degree
of freedom into the model. Hence, as a disciplining assumption, much of the literature has
assumed that expectations must be “rational” in the sense that they must be consistent with
the person’s own behavior.
5.3.1 Exogenous Expectations and Surprise Choice
In Example 1, the referent, R, was considered exogenous to choice. Applying expectations-
based models in such a way is effectively no different from applying standard models of
reference dependence. In their work, Koszegi and Rabin discuss how this approach might be
appropriate in surprise choice situations—that is, when expectations were likely determined
by other experiences completely unrelated to a choice that has suddenly been thrust upon
the person. In such settings, the model is applied exactly as in the examples above. As
we’ll see, some empirical applications pursue this approach, taking advantage of natural
arguments for what expectations might be.
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5.3.2 Endogenous Expectations Induced By Choice
A first rational-expectations approach assumes that when a person chooses a particular
option, that option fully determines the referent around which she experiences gain-loss
utility when the final outcome is realized. In other words (and using the notation from
Section 5.2), if the person chooses lottery L, the reference lottery becomes R = L, and thus
her utility would be U(L|L). The person would then choose the lottery that maximizes
U(L|L).
This assumption was originally incorporated into the models of disappointment aversion
(DA) of Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986). The motivation there is much as in
the paragraph above: when considering a lottery L, the person forms a “prior expectation”
about that lottery, and then once the uncertainty is resolved, the person experiences elation
or disappointment depending on how the realized outcome compares to that “prior expec-
tation”.34 More recently, Koszegi and Rabin (2007) incorporate this assumption into their
solution concept “choice-acclimating personal equilibrium” (CPE). Their motivation is ever-
so-slightly different, and goes as follows: if person commits to a lottery L well in advance
of the resolution of uncertainty, then by the time the uncertainty is resolved the person will
have come to expect the lottery L, and thus it becomes the referent around which gains and
losses are defined.
Hence, DA and CPE both assume a person chooses the lottery that maximizes U(L|L),
and differ only in their assumption about how a person compares a realized outcome to the
reference lottery. DA defines gain-loss utility according to equation 6, while CPE defines
gain-loss utility according to equation 7. It follows that under these two models a person
34Gul (1991) provides an alternative formulation of disappointment aversion in which the referent is the
certainty equivalent of the gamble, including disappointment when formulating that certainty equivalent.
Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986) effectively assume the referent is the certainty equivalent using
only intrinsic utility when formulating that certainty equivalent.
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evaluates lotteries according to:
DA: U(L|L) =
N∑
n=1
pn
[
u(xn) + µ
(
u(xn)−
N∑
m=1
pmu(xm)
)]
CPE: U(L|L) =
N∑
n=1
pn
[
u(xn) +
N∑
m=1
pmµ(u(xn)− u(xm))
]
.
For the CPE equation (and applying equation 5), if we order outcomes such that x1 ≤
x2 ≤ ... ≤ xN , one can derive that the CPE equation becomes
CPE: U(L|L) =
N∑
n=1
pnu(xn)−
N−1∑
n=1
[
N∑
m=n+1
pnpmη(λ− 1)(u(xm)− u(xn))
]
. (8)
From this equation, one can see that η and λ only matter through the product η(λ−1) ≡ Λ.
Hence, many applications of CPE in fact use the parameter Λ instead of η and λ, and we
often use Λ below.
For certain outcomes or for binary lotteries, DA and CPE yield identical equations for
U(L|L).35 For binary gambles, the reason is that the higher outcome will always be perceived
as a gain and the lower outcome as a loss regardless of whether the referent is the other
outcome or the gamble’s certainty equivalent. Hence, with a two-part-linear gain-loss utility
function, if the choice set contains only certain outcomes and binary lotteries, the two models
make identical predictions.
Panel A of Figure 4 depicts indifference curves for these models in the domain of binary
lotteries. For comparison, Panel A also presents indifference curves for an exogenous certain
reference point, r, while applying the same µ(·). Just like for a certain reference point,
DA/CPE generates kinked utility around certainty. Moreover, DA/CPE yields a larger kink
than a certain reference point, and thus generates a stronger preference for certain outcomes.
35For either model, one can derive that, for any binary lottery L = (x1, p1;x2, 1−p1) with x1 > x2, utility
is
U(L|L) = p1u(x1) + (1− p1)u(x2)− p1(1− p1)Λ[u(x1)− u(x2)].
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Intuitively, relative to having a certain outcome, when one chooses a lottery L with positive
expected value, not only does one now generate gain-loss utility (as would happen with a
certain reference point), but this gain-loss utility is magnified by the fact that choosing L
also means creating a disadvantageous reference lottery (e.g., under DA, a reference lottery
with a higher expected value against which gains and losses are defined). Hence, DA/CPE
is consistent with small- and moderate-stakes risk aversion (as discussed in Sections 2 and
4) with an even smaller extent of loss aversion.
It is also worth noting that both DA and CPE can generate violations of first-order
stochastic dominance.36 To illustrate, consider a choice between L1 ≡ ($10, 1) and L2 ≡
($10, .9; $20, .1). It is straightforward to derive that U(L1|L1) = 10 while U(L2|L2) = 11 −
.9Λ, and thus the person would choose the dominated lottery L1 if Λ > 1.1—e.g., if η = 1 and
λ = 2.5. (In Panel A of Figure 4, this possibility implies that it is possible for indifference
curves to be positively sloped.) Though such violations of first-order stochastic dominance
are viewed as a normatively unappealing prediction for a model of decision making (for
relevant discussion, see Quiggin 1982), several leading empirical examples of dominance
violations do exist (see, e.g., Gneezy et al. 2006).
For lotteries with more than two outcomes, DA and CPE differ. Panel B of Figure 4
starts to reveal the nature of this difference by presenting indifference curves in the Marschak-
Machina triangle for three-outcome prospects L = (x1, p1;x2, 1 − p1 − p3;x3, p3) with x1 <
x2 < x3. Panel B reveals that, even though these models do not assume any probability
weighting, in both models U(L|L) will be nonlinear in probabilities.37 The source of this
nonlinearity is simple: probabilities are present both in taking the expectation over utility
outcomes and in the referent itself. These nonlinearities reflect important implications.
On one hand, they reflect that these expectations-based models are consistent with some
prominent EU anomalies (that are inconsistent with status quo reference dependence). For
instance, these models can accommodate Allais’ two paradoxes. On the other hand, these
36The formulation in Gul (1991) does not have this property.
37The formulation in Gul (1991) does not have this property.
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nonlinearities reflect that these models can violate certain “normative” properties that we
might expect people to satisfy. We have already discussed possible violations of first-order
stochastic dominance. Another important example is violations of betweenness, wherein a
convex combination of two indifferent gambles should be indifferent to both. CPE decision
makers will generally be averse to such convex combinations as they induce greater potential
for losses.38
Panel B: DA and CPE Indifference Curves in Marschak−Machina Triangle
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Panel A: DA/CPE Indifference Curves for Two−Outcome Lotteries
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Note: Panel A presents DA/CPE indifference curves for prospects of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, 1 − p1), for
which the two models make identical predictions. Dashed line reflects indifference curve through (r, r) for
an agent with reference-dependent preferences and exogenous reference point r. Panel B presents DA and
CPE indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle for prospects of the form L = (x1, p1;x2, 1− p1−
p3;x3, p3) with x1 < x2 < x3, for which the two models make different predictions. Solid lines correspond
to CPE indifference curves; dashed line corresponds to DA indifference curves.
Figure 4: DA and CPE Indifference Curves
38For DA decisionmakers, the direction of violations of betweenness will depend on the EU certainty
equivalents of the indifferent gambles and that of the convex combination, making general conclusions more
challenging to draw. Under KR, the gain-loss comparisons are fixed, only their relative probabilities change,
yielding more clear predictions.
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5.3.3 Endogenous Expectations Induced by Planned Choice
Koszegi and Rabin (2007) motivate CPE as relevant for situations in which a person commits
to a choice well in advance of the resolution of uncertainty. In their original formulation,
Koszegi and Rabin (2006), they propose a different approach based on the following type of
situation: a person is confronted with a choice situation and given some time to formulate a
plan for which option they will choose; however, the person does not actually make (commit
to) that choice until shortly before the uncertainty is resolved. In such situations, it seems
reasonable to assume that, by the time one needs to make a choice, the person’s planned
choice becomes the referent.
Imposing rational expectations in this environment requires an equilibrium assumption.
Specifically, rational expectations require that planned choice be identical to actual choice.
At the same time, the person will in fact make that planned choice only if it is indeed optimal
given the expectations induced by that choice. Formally, they define a notion of personal
equilibrium (PE) to be a choice that a person would want to make given that he expects it.
Definition: Given a choice set L, a lottery L ∈ L is a personal equilibrium (PE)
if U(L|L) ≥ U(L′|L) for all L′ ∈ L.
Given its equilibrium nature, PE can lead to multiplicity. For instance, it could easily be
the case that L is better than L′ when expecting L, while L′ is better than L when expecting
L′. Example 2 illustrates this possibility:
——————————————————————–
Example 2: Consider a choice set L ≡ {L1, L2} where L1 = (0, 1) and L2 =
(−10, 1
2
; 10 + x, 1
2
).
• Given a reference lottery L1, U(L1|L1) = 0 while U(L2|L1) = x2 −
1
2
ηλ(10)+ 1
2
η(10+x),
and thus U(L1|L1) ≥ U(L2|L1) if and only if x ≤ η(λ−1)1+η 10. In other words, L1 is a PE
when x ≤ η(λ−1)
1+η
10.
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• Given a reference lottery L2, U(L1|L2) = 0 + 12η(10)−
1
2
ηλ(10 + x) while U(L2|L2) =
x
2
− 1
4
η(λ − 1)(20 + x), and thus U(L2|L2) ≥ U(L1|L2) if and only if x ≥ 0. In other
words, L2 is a PE when x ≥ 0.
• Hence, for any x ∈ [0, η(λ−1)
1+η
10], L1 and L2 are both PE.
——————————————————————–
Example 2 not only illustrates the multiplicity of PE, but also highlights that this mul-
tiplicity shows up even in straightforward examples such as a decision whether to accept
a 50-50 gamble. On one hand, this multiplicity might provide an explanation for certain
behaviors if features of the environment lead one to select one PE over another. On the
other hand, however, Koszegi and Rabin point out that there is a natural selection criterion
to use. In particular, when there are multiple PE, it means that there are multiple consistent
plans. Since, when formulating a plan, the person is of course free to choose which of these
consistent plans to follow, it seems natural to assume that the person would choose the
consistent plan that yields the largest ex-ante utility (as reflected by U(L|L)). KR formalize
this as a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE):
Definition: Given a choice set L, a lottery L ∈ L is a preferred personal equilib-
rium (PPE) if it is a PE and if for any other PE L′, U(L|L) ≥ U(L′|L′).
To illustrate, we continue with Example 2:
——————————————————————–
Example 2 (continued):
• Applying the equations above, U(L1|L1) ≥ U(L2|L2) for any x ≤ η(λ−1)1−η(λ−1)/210. Because
η(λ−1)
1−η(λ−1)/210 >
η(λ−1)
1+η
10, U(L1|L1) > U(L2|L2) for any x ∈ [0, η(λ−1)1+η 10]. It follows
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that L1 is the unique PPE for all x ≤ η(λ−1)1+η 10, while L2 is the unique PPE for all
x > η(λ−1)
1+η
10.
• Finally, note that if we apply CPE to this example, L1 is a CPE for all x ≤ η(λ−1)1−η(λ−1)/210,
while L2 is a CPE for all x ≥ η(λ−1)1−η(λ−1)/210.
——————————————————————–
Several features of PE and PPE warrant attention. First, as highlighted in Example 2,
often the determinant of when a lottery is a PPE is not ex ante utility, but rather when it
is a PE. In Example 2, even though the certain L1 continues to yield higher ex ante utility
for some x > η(λ−1)
1+η
10, it stops being a PE—that is, even if the person planned on choosing
L1, she wouldn’t carry out that plan. Second, and closely related, note the key difference
between PPE and CPE: under CPE, the chosen option need not be a PE. In Example 2, for
x ∈ (η(λ−1)
1+η
10, η(λ−1)
1−η(λ−1)/210] we have that L1 is a CPE but not a PPE or PE. Third, and again
closely related, in Example 2 CPE yields more risk aversion than PPE. In fact, this reflects
a more general result (see Proposition 8 in Koszegi and Rabin (2007)) that CPE yields more
risk aversion than PPE.
Fourth, unlike CPE, PE and PPE cannot yield violations of first-order stochastic domi-
nance. For any fixed referent R, U(L|R) is monotonic. Hence, if lottery L′ dominates lottery
L, then U(L′|L) > U(L|L), and therefore L could not be a PE or a PPE. Finally, because
PE is defined relative to the specific options in the choice set, PE and PPE are not easily
represented by indifference sets as we have done with models in prior sections.39
5.4 Applying Expectations-Based Models
Before turning to specific applications, we briefly discuss several additional issues that emerge
when one applies the expectations-based models described above.
39Also note that, unlike for CPE, for PE or PPE η and λ enter in ways that cannot be reduced to
Λ ≡ η(λ− 1).
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First, our discussion describes several different assumptions one might make about the
determinants of the referent, and one must make a decision about which approach to apply.
Koszegi and Rabin suggest a psychological basis for making this decision as a function of the
timing of the decision at hand. In situations where one commits to a choice well in advance
of the realization of outcomes, they suggest that the DA/CPE approach is appropriate.
Insurance choices might fall into this category. In situations where one makes a plan well
in advance of the realization of outcomes but commits to a choice only shortly before the
realization of outcomes, they suggest that PE or PPE is appropriate. Shopping decisions
might fall into this category (as described in Section 6.4). Finally, in surprise situations
where a person is presented with a choice shortly before the realization of outcomes, they
suggest using an exogenous reference lottery based on prior expectations.
The potential slipperiness of having multiple solution techniques was not lost on the
authors, who note the additional explanatory power of this freedom (see Koszegi and Ra-
bin 2006, pg. 1141 for discussion). In applications of expectations-based loss aversion,
researchers often have not been as attentive as they ought to be to the question of what
is the proper solution concept. Indeed, because CPE is significantly more tractable and
straightforward to work with, it is the solution concept that is most frequently used, includ-
ing in situations where it might not be appropriate. In Section 7.3, we’ll discuss another
potential issue for both PPE and CPE: they are static concepts that ignore possible “news”
utility associated with making a plan (for PPE) or choice (for CPE).
Second, our presentation above considers the case of choices over simple monetary gam-
bles. In many applications, there will be multiple dimensions of consumption (in their original
work, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) frame their model for this domain). It turns out that, if
as in Section 3.3 one assumes that intrinsic utility and gain-loss utility are both additively
separable across goods, then it is straightforward to extend the approaches in Section 5.2.
Specifically, consider lotteries of the form L ≡ (x1, p1; ...; xN , pN) where xn ≡ (x1n, ..., xKn ) is
a consumption bundle over K dimensions of consumption, and consider reference lotteries of
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the form R ≡ (r1, q1; ...; rM , qM) where rm ≡ (r1m, ..., rKm) is a reference consumption bundle
over the same K dimensions of consumption. Then utility under the KR-approach and the
DA-approach are:
KR-approach: U(L|R) ≡
N∑
n=1
pn
[
K∑
k=1
(
uk(x
k
n) +
M∑
m=1
qmµ(uk(x
k
n)− uk(rkm)
)]
DA-approach: U(L|R) ≡
N∑
n=1
pn
[
K∑
k=1
(
uk(x
k
n) + µ
(
uk(x
k
n)−
M∑
m=1
qmuk(r
k
m)
))]
Given U(L|R), we can apply the different solution concepts from Section 5.3
Third, when one applies the PE or PPE solution concepts, it might be natural to extend
the model to incorporate exogenous uncertainty that is resolved between the time that plans
are formulated and the time that a choice is made (again, in their original work, Koszegi and
Rabin (2006) frame their model for this domain). When shopping, for instance, it could be
that one forms an ex ante plan for whether to purchase an item as a function of the market
price, but does not learn the market price until arriving at the store. It is straightforward to
extend the model to such situations. Following Koszegi and Rabin (2006), let the exogenous
uncertainty be reflected in a state s with distribution Q(s), where state s generates a choice
set L(s). Because a final choice is made after s is revealed, an ex ante plan is a strategy L∗
where L∗(s) ∈ L(s) is the planned choice for state s. Finally, let GL∗ denote the ex ante
distribution over outcomes (i.e., over the xn’s) induced by Q and L
∗. Then a strategy L∗ is
a PE if, for every state s, U(L∗(s)|GL∗) ≥ U(L|GL∗) for all L ∈ L(s), and L∗ is a PPE if
it is a PE and for any other PE L∗
′
we have U(GL∗|GL∗) ≥ U(GL∗′ |GL∗′ ). We consider an
example of this type in the next section.
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6 Applications of Expectations-Based Models
Koszegi and Rabin’s work inspired a wave of applied work that both develops implications of
expectations-based reference dependence and tests many of those implications. Once again,
much of this work focuses on the domains of the endowment effect and daily labor supply
as these domains again permit sharp tests of model predictions. We begin our discussion
with these two domains, but then move on to work in other, more economically important
domains. As we’ll see, not surprisingly, the evidence has not provided clean answers. At the
same time, however, this work has sharpened researchers’ thinking about reference-dependent
preferences.
6.1 Endowment Effect
Section 4.1 describes early evidence on the endowment effect, and develops a simple model
that illustrates the loss-aversion interpretation of the endowment effect. Numerous studies
prior to the turn of the century seemed to find robust support for the endowment effect—
indeed, Knetsch et al. (2001) write (p. 257), “The endowment effect and loss aversion
have been among the most robust findings of the psychology of decision making.” However,
research since 2000 has questioned this robustness, which in turn has led to a reexamination
of the simple loss-aversion interpretation, including an assessment of whether models of
expectations-based reference dependence might better explain behavior.
A first line of inquiry into the robustness and field validity of the endowment effect re-
volved around the role of market experience. In two influential papers, List (2003, 2004)
demonstrates that market experience can reduce and perhaps even eliminate the endowment
effect. Specifically, he considers subjects at a sportscard show, where he compares behavior
of professional dealers, experienced nondealers, and inexperienced nondealers.40 List inves-
tigates whether these subjects exhibit an endowment effect for sports memorabilia and for
40The partition of nondealers into experienced vs. inexperienced is done using survey data on the average
number of sports memorabilia trades they make per month.
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mugs vs. candy bars. In both cases, inexperienced nondealers exhibit significant endow-
ment effects, people with more trading experience exhibit smaller endowment effects, and
professional dealers seem to exhibit no endowment effect. These results suggest that the
endowment effect might have limited relevance for field exchange behavior if exchanges are
generally undertaken by experienced agents.
A second line of inquiry into the robustness and field validity of the endowment effect
investigated whether the basic result itself is “real” or instead merely an artifact of experi-
mental protocols. Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) argue that the language used when providing
subjects with their endowments, visual and physical cues, and the language used to describe
the choice options can all serve to create experimenter demand effects. They demonstrate
how procedural variations along these dimensions can alter the magnitude of the endowment
effect, and in fact under their “full set of procedural controls” they are able to eliminate the
endowment effect entirely.
Early responses to these critiques argued that the additional context—i.e., market ex-
perience or procedural controls—served to alter people’s reference points. Perhaps people
with market experience do not code a newly obtained object as something to be consumed,
and thus don’t feel a sense of loss when they give it up. Perhaps Plott and Zeiler’s proce-
dural controls actually served to undermine a feeling of endowment. With the reemergence
of expectations-based loss aversion in Koszegi and Rabin (2006), these arguments became
naturally framed in terms of expectations.
It is instructive to formalize these arguments. For comparison to List (2003, 2004), Plott
and Zeiler (2007), and the more recent work below, we do so in the context of the exchange
paradigm. Consider the mug vs. pen version of the endowment effect model from Section 4.1
in which final consumption is a vector (xM , xP ), where xM ∈ {0, 1} is mug consumption and
xP ∈ {0, 1} is pen consumption. Recall that vM and vP are the intrinsic valuations for the
two items, and we apply the two-part linear universal gain-loss utility function in equation
5.
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Suppose that standard procedures in endowment-effect experiments naturally lead a per-
son endowed with a mug to relatively quickly expect to leave the experiment with that
mug—i.e., to adopt a reference bundle rMUG ≡ (1, 0). Analogously, a person endowed with a
pen might quickly adopt a reference point rPEN ≡ (0, 1). If subjects then make choices with
these (now exogenous) reference points, the predictions are equivalent to the endowment-
effect model in Section 4.1—specifically, subjects endowed with a pen choose to keep the
pen if vP >
1+η
1+ηλ
vM , whereas subjects endowed with a mug choose to trade for a pen if
vP >
1+ηλ
1+η
vM .
Next, consider how market experience or procedural controls might alter behavior. An
interpretation of the intuition above is that market experience or procedural controls can
break the link between being endowed with an object and an expectation to consume that
object. In other words, they might lead subjects to adopt a reference point r0 ≡ (0, 0)
regardless of endowment, in which case they would choose pen when vP > vM regardless
of endowment.41 Koszegi and Rabin (2006) explicitly suggest these interpretations, and
Knetsch and Wong (2009) conduct an experiment with procedures explicitly designed to
alter expectations and find evidence consistent with these interpretations.
The logic above assumes exogenous (at the time of choice) expectations determined by
a combination of past experience (e.g., market experience) and experimental procedures.
One might instead consider endogenous expectations as in Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. However,
because endogenous expectations are forward-looking and thus depend on treatment only
if treatment impacts the choice set, endogenous expectations have trouble generating an
endowment effect. For example, in the standard mugs-vs.-pens paradigm, the choice set is
{cMUG ≡ (1, 0), cPEN ≡ (0, 1)} regardless of endowment. Example 3 works out predictions
under various models of endogenous expectations.
——————————————————————–
41One could also imagine intermediate cases. For instance, if upon being endowed with a mug a person
comes to expect there is a 60% chance of leaving with a mug and a 40% chance of something else, then she
might adopt a reference lottery R ≡ ((1, 0), .6; (0, 0), .4).
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Example 3: Consider a choice set {cMUG ≡ (1, 0), cPEN ≡ (0, 1)}.
• CPE: U(cMUG|cMUG) = vM and U(cPEN |cPEN) = vP . cPEN is a CPE if U(cPEN |cPEN) ≥
U(cMUG|cMUG), or vP ≥ vM . Analogously, cMUG is a CPE if vP ≤ vM .
• PE: U(cMUG|cPEN) = vM + [−ηλvP + ηvM ]. cPEN is a PE if U(cPEN |cPEN) ≥
U(cMUG|cPEN), or vP ≥ 1+η1+ηλvM . Analogously, c
MUG is a PE if vP ≤ 1+ηλ1+η vM .
• PPE: For vP ∈
[
1+η
1+ηλ
vM ,
1+ηλ
1+η
vM
]
, cPEN and cMUG are both PE. Comparing U(cMUG|cMUG)
and U(cPEN |cPEN), cPEN is ex-ante preferred when vP ≥ vM . It follows that cPEN is
a PPE for vP ≥ vM , and cMUG is a PPE for vP ≤ vM .
——————————————————————–
From Example 3, we see that CPE and PPE permit no possibility of an endowment
effect in the standard experimental design. Again, because expectations are fully forward-
looking, endowment is irrelevant, and in fact the prediction under either CPE or PPE is
that people choose the item that yields the largest intrinsic value. PE, in contrast, permits
some scope for an endowment effect. Specifically, because for some people—those with vP ∈[
1+η
1+ηλ
vM ,
1+ηλ
1+η
vM
]
—there are multiple PE, an endowment effect could emerge if endowment
has a systematic effect on equilibrium selection wherein those endowed with item k are more
prone to follow the PE of choosing ck. Of course, interpreting the endowment effect as driven
entirely by the needed equilibrium selection is not entirely satisfying.
Recently, researchers have attempted to directly test whether endogenous expectations
are impacting behavior in the endowment-effect paradigm by altering the paradigm in a
way that should impact behavior under endogenous expectations but not under exogenous
expectations. One possibility—pursued by Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Heffetz and List
(2014)—is to introduce a chance that trade is not permitted. In other words, subjects are
endowed with one item, then told that they might be able to trade it for another item, but,
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in the event they choose to trade, with probability q (varied across subjects) the trade will
not be permitted.
With this modification, the choice set depends on endowment. For subjects endowed
with a pen, the choice set becomes {FPEN ≡ ((0, 1), 1), FMUG ≡ ((1, 0), 1 − q; (0, 1), q)}. In
other words, if a subject chooses to keep the pen, she’ll end up with the pen no matter
whether trade is permitted, and thus she is choosing lottery FPEN . If instead she chooses
to trade for a mug, the trade will succeed with probability 1 − q, and thus she is choosing
lottery FMUG. Using an analogous logic, for subjects endowed with a mug, the choice set
becomes {F ′PEN ≡ ((0, 1), 1− q; (1, 0), q), F ′MUG ≡ ((1, 0), 1}. Example 4 derives predictions
for subjects endowed with pens under various models of the referent. (Given the symmetry
of this model, predictions for subjects endowed with mugs are analogous.)
——————————————————————–
Example 4: Consider a choice set
{FPEN ≡ ((1, 0), 1), FMUG ≡ ((1, 0), 1− q; (0, 1), q)}.
• Given an exogenous reference point rPEN ≡ (0, 1), the person will choose FPEN
if vP ≥ 1+η1+ηλvM , because U(FPEN |r
PEN) = vP and U(FMUG|rPEN) = qvP + (1 −
q) [vM − ηλvP + ηvM ].
• CPE: U(FPEN |FPEN) = vP and U(FMUG|FMUG) = qvP+(1−q)vM−q(1−q)Λ(vP+vM).
FPEN is a CPE if U(FPEN |FPEN) ≥ U(FMUG|FMUG), or vP ≥ 1−qΛ1+qΛvM ≡ v̄
CPE(q).
Analogously, FMUG is a CPE if vP ≤ v̄CPE(q). Note that v̄CPE(q) is decreasing in q.
• PE: U(FMUG|FPEN) = qvP + (1 − q)vM + (1 − q) [−ηλvP + ηvM ]. FPEN is a PE if
U(FPEN |FPEN) ≥ U(FMUG|FPEN), or vP ≥ 1+η1+ηλvM ≡ v̄
KEEP . U(FPEN |FMUG) =
vP + (1 − q) [−ηλvM + ηvP ]. FMUG is a PE if U(FMUG|FMUG) ≥ U(FPEN |FMUG), or
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vP ≤ 1+qη+(1−q)ηλ1+qηλ+(1−q)ηvM ≡ v̄
TRADE(q). Note that v̄TRADE(0) = 1+ηλ
1+η
vM , v̄
TRADE(q) is
decreasing in q, and v̄TRADE(1) = v̄KEEP .
• PPE: For vP ∈
[
v̄KEEP , v̄TRADE(q)
]
, FPEN and FMUG are both PE. Comparing U(FPEN |FPEN)
and U(FMUG|FMUG), FPEN is ex-ante preferred when vP ≥ v̄CPE(q). It follows that
FPEN is a PPE for vP ≥ max
{
v̄CPE(q), v̄KEEP
}
≡ v̄PPE(q), and otherwise FMUG
is a PPE. Note that v̄CPE(0) > v̄KEEP , v̄CPE(q) is decreasing in q, and there exists
q′ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that v̄CPE(q) < v̄KEEP for all q > q′.
• Figure 5 depicts v̄CPE(q), v̄KEEP , v̄TRADE(q), and v̄PPE(q).
——————————————————————–
From Example 4, if endowing a person with a pen leads that person to adopt a reference
point rPEN ≡ (0, 1), then trading decisions are not affected by the possibility that trade is
not permitted. In contrast, under CPE or PPE, an increase in q makes people endowed with
pens more likely to choose to keep the pen (because the cutoff v̄ declines).42 Because an
analogous logic holds for people endowed with mugs, it follows that, under CPE or PPE, an
increase in q should increase exchange asymmetries. Intuitively, as the probability of being
stuck with the endowed item increases, the person’s expectations of leaving with that item
increase, and thus the person is more likely to choose to keep it.
Ericson and Fuster (2011) and Heffetz and List (2014) provide similar experimental de-
signs that manipulate the probability with which exchange is not permitted. The results are
mixed. Using a relatively small sample (45 subjects) and endowing everyone with the same
good, Ericson and Fuster (2011) find support for endogenous expectations: subjects who
faced q = 10% were more willing to trade than subjects who faced q = 90%.43 Across three
42Under PPE, this effect holds for small q. For q large enough, further increases in q do not affect trading
decisions.
43Ericson and Fuster (2011) also use a similar approach in a valuation task, and again find support for
endogenous expectations. Camerer et al. (2016) conduct a replication of this second Ericson and Fuster
(2011) experiment as part of their large replication exercise of experimental economics findings. The Ericson
and Fuster (2011) treatment effect was within the confidence interval of the replication and the replication’s
treatment effect was marginally significant.
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Note: Figure presents the four thresholds defined in Example 4 for a person who is endowed with a pen
when the probability that exchange is not permitted is q. Keeping the pen is a CPE for any vP ≥ v̄CPE(q),
and trading for a mug is a CPE for any vP ≤ v̄CPE(q). Keeping the pen is a PE for any vP ≥ v̄KEEP ,
trading for a mug is a PE for any vP ≤ v̄TRADE(q), and both are PE for any vP ∈ [v̄KEEP , v̄TRADE(q)].
Keeping the pen is a PPE for any vP ≥ v̄PPE(q), and trading for a mug is a PPE for any vP < v̄PPE(q).
Figure 5: Exchange Behavior When Trade Possibly Not Permitted
experiments with a substantially larger sample (a total of 560 subjects), Heffetz and List
(2014) do not find a significant impact of q = 1% vs. q = 99% or of q = 10% vs. q = 90%.
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Moreover, unlike Ericson and Fuster (2011), Heffetz and List (2014) randomly endow sub-
jects with one of the two items, and this endowment impacts behavior (independent of q) in
a way that is consistent with standard endowment effects.
In an alternative approach, Goette et al. (Forthcoming) instead introduce a possibility
that subjects are forced to trade. In other words, subjects are endowed with one item, then
told that they’ll have the opportunity to trade it for another item, but, in the event that
they choose to keep the item, with probability q they’ll be forced to trade it. Again, this
modification makes the choice set depend on endowment, and, interestingly, flips the choice
sets relative to the case where trade might not be permitted. Specifically, subjects endowed
with pens face choice set {F ′PEN ≡ ((0, 1), 1− q; (1, 0), q), F ′MUG ≡ ((1, 0), 1}, while subjects
endowed with mugs face choice set {FPEN ≡ ((0, 1), 1), FMUG ≡ ((1, 0), 1− q; (0, 1), q)}. We
can thus use the derivations in Example 4, except that these now apply for subjects endowed
with mugs.
Several conclusions follow. First, while not derived in Example 4, it is straightforward
to derive that if endowing a person with a mug leads that person to adopt a reference point
rMUG ≡ (1, 0), then trading decisions are not affected by the possibility of forced trade.
Second, under CPE or PPE, an increase in q makes people endowed with mugs more likely
to trade for pens.44 Because an analogous logic holds for people endowed with pens, it follows
that, under CPE or PPE, an increase in q should yield increased exchange asymmetries in the
opposite direction from the endowment effect—people endowed with pens are more likely to
choose mugs than people endowed with mugs. Intuitively, as the probability of being forced
to trade for the alternative item increases, the person’s expectations of leaving with that
alternative item increase, and thus the person is more likely to trade to get it.
Goette et al. (Forthcoming) provide a set of three experiments to test this prediction.
They do so in the context of a valuation task, but the predictions are analogous—e.g., under
CPE or PPE, q > 0 implies WTP > WTA, and the larger is q the larger is this reverse
44Again, under PPE, this effect holds for small q, but for q large enough further increases in q do not affect
trading decisions.
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WTP -WTA disparity. However, Goette et al. (Forthcoming) find that q seems to have
limited impact on behavior in two of their three experiments. Moreover, for all q that they
consider, they find a standard endowment effect, and never find a reverse endowment effect.
WTA exceeds WTP by around 50 percent when q = 0 and similar magnitude gaps are
observed across a range of probabilities in two of their three experiments. In one experiment
the directional effects of the KR predictions are supported.
In a recent working paper, Heffetz (2018) raises the possibility that beliefs might need
to “sink in” before they become the referent, and further suggests that the different results
in the literature might be due to experimental differences that impact the extent to which
beliefs sink in before choices are made. To investigate this possibility, Heffetz develops a
sink-in manipulation in which subjects experience the relevant probability (a 1-in-6 chance)
through a series of 18 die rolls before making the choice of interest. When Heffetz (2018)
applies this manipulation in the Heffetz and List (2014) paradigm, he indeed finds evidence
consistent with the CPE/PPE prediction. (However, this sink-in manipulation does not have
an analogous impact in the labor-supply paradigm discussed in the next subsection.)
Taken together, the combined findings of Heffetz and List (2014) and Goette et al. (Forth-
coming) perhaps lend support to the original interpretation of Koszegi and Rabin (2006). In
other words, perhaps subjects in endowment-effect experiments are not heavily influenced
by forward-looking reference points. Rather, in many instances, their behavior is quite con-
sistent with, upon being endowed with an item, quickly expecting to leave the experiment
with that item. Of course, the results of List (2003, 2004), Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007),
Ericson and Fuster (2011), and Heffetz (2018) suggest that it is sometimes possible to break
this expectation. Clearly more work is needed to fully understand behavior in this domain.
6.2 Labor Supply
One of the most prominent debates surrounding reference-dependent preferences revolves
around the possibility of daily income targeting in the domain of labor supply. In this
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section, we describe this debate and the role of expectations-based loss aversion in this
debate. In addition, we also describe recent experiments on labor supply in real-effort tasks
that were designed to explicitly test expectations-based loss aversion.
In Section 4.2, we described the basic hypothesis of daily income targeting, and how
it could sometimes—but not always—lead to negative wage elasticities. We also described
the seminal work by Camerer et al. (1997) who indeed found evidence of negative wage
elasticities using three datasets of New York City cab drivers.
Farber (2005) points out two issues in the approach of Camerer et al. (1997). First,
the approach relies on an assumption that there exists a “daily wage,” and Farber presents
evidence suggesting substantial variation in each driver’s hourly wage over the course of a
day. Second, Farber revisits the issue of division bias due to hourly wages being calculated
using earnings divided by hours. Camerer et al. (1997) recognize and attempt to address this
issue using an instrumental variables strategy, but Farber argues that the instrument is not
effective. But Farber’s main contribution is to point out a better approach that avoids both
problems: treat the unit of observation as a trip, and estimate a discrete-choice stopping
model.
Specifically, Farber (2005) uses a reduced-form approach that assumes driver i will stop
after trip τ if Riτ ≥ 0 where
Riτ ≡ γhhiτ + γyyiτ + Xiβ + δi + εiτ . (9)
In this specification, hiτ and yiτ are cumulative hours worked and cumulative earnings after
driver i completes trip τ , Xi is a vector of control variables, and δi captures individual fixed
effects. A standard labor-supply model would imply that cumulative hours should have
an impact on the stopping probabilities (γh > 0) because as cumulative hours increase the
marginal cost of further effort also increases. In contrast, a standard model would imply that
cumulative earnings should not affect stopping probabilities (γy = 0).
45 Farber’s estimates
45More precisely, this conclusion holds under the reasonable assumption that daily earnings are such a
64
support both predictions, albeit with wide confidence intervals in the case of γ̂y.
In terms of ruling out daily income targeting, Farber (2005) has a potential problem:
he is using a misspecified model of the role of cumulative earnings. Given the specification
in equation 9, cumulative earnings has a linear impact on the probability of stopping. In
contrast, the model from Section 4.2 suggests cumulative earnings should have a threshold
impact on the probability of stopping—that is, γyyiτ should be replaced with θyI(yiτ ≥ ȳ)
where I is an indicator function and ȳ is target earnings. Moreover, if stopping typically
occurs around target earnings, then the vast majority of observations will have yiτ < ȳ. As
a result, even if there is daily income targeting, one might expect to estimate γ̂y ≈ 0 given
the specification in Farber (2005).46
Farber (2008) addresses this problem by instead using a threshold specification for the
impact of cumulative earnings. However, because target earnings are unobserved, he cannot
take an analogous reduced-form approach. Instead, he estimates a structural model in which
target earnings is a latent variable that varies across drivers and across days—specifically,
he assumes the target, ȳ, is normally distributed. When Farber estimates this model, he
finds significant evidence of income targeting (θ̂y > 0). At the same time, he finds evidence
of substantial day-to-day and between-driver variation in target earnings, and moreover
that most shifts appear to stop before target earnings are met. From these findings, Farber
concludes that, while income targeting may occur, it has limited value for predicting behavior
both in the cross-section and over time, and thus has limited value for economics.
Crawford and Meng (2011) incorporate theoretical insights from expectations-based loss
aversion into this debate. In particular, they argue that we need not treat target earnings as a
latent variable, because we can assume that target earnings ȳ are equal to recent expectations
about earnings (operationalized as average earnings on days in the recent past). In effect,
small part of lifetime earnings that they have no impact of the marginal utility of lifetime income.
46The logic behind this claim combines the selection problem of seeing few observations beyond the target
and the misspecification of functional form. For a reference-dependent agent, earnings should have zero
impact on stopping for all yiτ < ȳ, and θy impact on stopping for all yiτ > ȳ. If the vast majority of
observations have yiτ < ȳ, the linear regression line would have approximately zero slope.
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the challenge of predicting the target by Farber (2008) is overcome via the assumption of
rational expectations. Moreover, they argue that drivers should exhibit expectations-based
loss aversion over hours worked as well, where target hours h̄ are equal to recent expectations
about hours (operationalized as average hours on days in the recent past).
Based on this logic, Crawford and Meng (2011) use a reduced-form approach that assumes
driver i will stop after trip τ if Riτ ≥ 0 where
Riτ ≡ γhhiτ + θhI(hiτ > h̄) + γyyiτ + θyI(yiτ > ȳ) + Xiβ + δi + εiτ . (10)
They find (see their Table 3) that, consistent with expectations-based loss aversion, the
probability of stopping depends on cumulative earnings only through the threshold effect
(i.e., θ̂y > 0 and γ̂y ≈ 0). Moreover, they also find that the probability of stopping depends
on cumulative hours through the linear effect (γ̂h > 0)—as one would expect from a standard
labor-supply model—and also through the threshold effect (θ̂h > 0), which is consistent
with expectations-based loss aversion over hours worked.47 Crawford and Meng (2011) go
on to estimate a structural model that permits an estimate of the degree of loss aversion.
Interestingly, their estimates suggest stronger loss aversion over hours worked, although they
cannot reject equal loss aversion along the two dimensions.48
Thakral and To (2017) provide a new perspective on this debate by investigating the
importance of the timing of earnings within a day. Using a dataset of all New York City taxi
trips in 2013, and using a more flexible version of the approach in Farber (2005), Thakral
and To first find that the probability of stopping depends on cumulative earnings for the day
as predicted by income targeting. More importantly, when, unlike the prior literature, they
47Agarwal et al. (2015) apply a similar approach to data on Singapore taxicab drivers, and find similar
results.
48Farber (2015) revisits labor supply decisions with a much larger and richer dataset. Interestingly, while
he attempts to explicitly test the possibility of expectations-based loss aversion, he does so within the context
of estimating wage elasticities—while still acknowledging that this approach might be problematic due to
there not being a “daily wage.” Farber (2015) also considers a stopping-model approach, and while he uses
a more flexible approach than in Farber (2005) for how cumulative hours and cumulative earnings might
impact the probability of stopping, he does not permit a threshold based on expected hours or earnings.
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allow for a differential impact of earnings from different times in the day, they find that the
probability of stopping is most sensitive to earnings in the most-recent past. This finding is
inconsistent with the typical assumption in the prior literature that there is a daily referent
(that might be exogenous or based on expectations for that day). Instead, to explain their
findings, Thakral and To develop a model in which the referent adjusts over the course of a
shift in response to realized earnings—so that by, say, the eighth hour of the shift, earnings
from the first few hours of the shift are mostly incorporated into the referent and thus have
little impact on stopping, while earnings from the most-recent hours of the shift are mostly
not incorporated into the referent and thus have a significant impact on stopping.
In parallel to the field analyses above, several experiments have studied expectations-
based loss aversion in the domain of labor supply from a different angle: they use real-effort
tasks as a means to conduct explicit tests of the theory. The general approach asks subjects
to engage in some sort of experimental task that requires effort, where subjects are paid as
a function of that effort. The key feature is that payments are delivered in the form of a
lottery, designed such that if that lottery becomes a subject’s reference lottery, then features
of that lottery will have a predictable impact on the subject’s behavior.
Abeler et al. (2011) use an individual decision problem in which subjects exert effort to
count the number of zeros in tables that consist of 150 randomly ordered zeros and ones.
Subjects were permitted to continue as long as they liked, up to a maximum of 60 minutes
(on average subjects worked roughly 35 minutes). Letting e denote the number of tables
solved correctly, subjects were paid according to the lottery (we, 1
2
;F, 1
2
). In other words,
there was a 50% chance that a subject was paid according to her acquired earnings at some
wage rate w (20 cents in the experiment), and there was a 50% chance she was paid a fixed
payment F .49
The payment scheme was chosen to test for expectations-based loss aversion. For standard
49This lottery was implemented by having subjects choose, before starting the task, between two envelopes,
one which contained a card saying “Acquired earnings” and one which contained a card saying “F euros.”
The chosen envelope was opened after the subject decided to stop working.
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agents (including standard reference-dependent agents), the fixed payment F should be
irrelevant to the choice of when to stop as it does not alter marginal benefits. In contrast, for
agents with expectations-based loss aversion—in particular for whom the lottery (we, 1
2
;F, 1
2
)
becomes their reference lottery—F influences their choice. Analogous to the logic from Figure
3, there exists a kink in marginal benefits of effort at exactly we = F . For any e such that
we ≤ F , increases in e reduce gain-loss disutility, and thus the marginal benefit from e is
larger than it would be if the person only cared about intrinsic utility. Analogously, for any
e such that we ≥ F , increases in e increase gain-loss disutility, and thus the marginal benefit
from e is smaller than it would be if the person only cared about intrinsic utility.
To test for expectations-based loss aversion, Abeler et al. (2011) consider two treatments,
one with F = 3 euros, and one with F = 7 euros. They focus on two predictions of the
intuition above. First, the discrete drop in the marginal benefit at we = F implies that
there should be bunching at we = 3 in the F = 3 treatment and bunching at we = 7 in
the F = 7 treatment. Second, for a person who would choose we ∈ [3, 7) in the F = 3
treatment, the increase in the marginal benefit in this range should lead them to choose a
larger we in the F = 7 treatment.50 As a result, on average we should be larger in the
F = 7 treatment. They indeed find support for both predictions.51 Camerer et al. (2016)
conduct a replication of the Abeler et al. (2011) experiment as part of their large replication
exercise of experimental economics findings. While the Abeler et al. (2011) treatment effect
was within the confidence interval of the replication, the replication’s treatment effect was
not statistically significant.
In independent and contemporaneous work, Gill and Prowse (2012) test expectations-
based loss aversion using a different payoff scheme. They consider a two-player sequential-
50Abeler et al. (2011) formally derive these predictions for CPE (which is equivalent to DA in this domain
given the binary lottery). One can show that the predictions are qualitatively the same under PPE.
51The data are not consistent with the more precise prediction that the two treatments should not impact
the percent of participants who choose we > 7, as only 42% do so in the F = 3 treatment while 55% do so
in the F = 7 treatment (percentages calculated from Figure 1 in Abeler et al. (2011)). The data also show
suggestive evidence of subjects using focal points—e.g., choosing we equal to 5 or 10—raising the question
whether the treatment is serving as a focal point rather than changing the reference lottery.
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move game in which subjects exert effort to adjust sliders to a target position using their
computer mouse. First, player 1 has 120 seconds to correctly adjust as many sliders as
possible (out of 48). Next, player 2 observes player 1’s performance and then carries out the
same task. Finally, one player earns a prize v, where the probability that each player wins
the prize is determined by their performances—specifically, letting ei denote the number of
correctly adjusted sliders by player i, player i’s probability of winning the prize is
Pi(ei, ej) =
50 + ei − ej
100
.
Throughout their analysis, Gill and Prowse focus on the behavior of player 2, because the
goal is to analyze player 2’s behavior as a function of the observed e1.
52 For standard agents
(including standard reference-dependent agents), e1 should have no impact on e2, because
the marginal benefit from increasing e2 is independent of e1—i.e., (∂P2/∂e2)v is independent
of e1. Gill and Prowse show that, for agents who behave according to DA/CPE (which are
the same in this domain), player 2 should react to an increase in e1 by reducing e2. In their
experiment, they indeed find evidence of this discouragement effect. They further use their
data to estimate a structural model, and they estimate an average Λ = 1.7 (although with
significant heterogeneity, including 17% with Λ < 0).
Gneezy et al. (2017) expand on the analysis in Abeler et al. (2011). In particular, they
use the same experimental structure, except that subjects were paid according to the lottery
(we, 1
2
;F, p; 0, 1
2
−p) where F > 0 and p ≤ 1/2. The two treatments in Abeler et al correspond
to p = 1/2 and F = 3 or 7. Gneezy et al. consider those treatments, and further consider
p = 1/2 and F = 0 or 14, and thus they consider further variation in the fixed payment.
Moreover, Gneezy et al. also consider treatments with F = 14 and p = .125, .250, and
.375. They show that models of expectations-based loss aversion imply that effort should
be monotonically increasing in the fixed payment when p = 1/2 (just as in Abeler et al),
52Hence, in principle, the authors could have conducted the same experiment with only one subject while
varying e1 exogenously.
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and that effort should be monotonically increasing in p when F = 14. The data contradict
these predictions of monotonicity. Specifically, when p = 1/2 they find that average effort is
lowest when F = 3, and when F = 14, they find that average effort is lowest when p = .25.
To investigate whether the results in Gneezy et al. (2017) might be in part due to beliefs
not sinking in and thereby becoming the referent, Heffetz (2018) also incorporates his sink-in
manipulation (discussed in Section 6.1) to a variant of the Gneezy et al. (2017) paradigm.
Unlike in the endowment-effect paradigm, here the sink-in manipulation had no impact
on behavior, and the results are consistent with the results in Gneezy et al. (2017)—and
inconsistent with the predictions of CPE or PPE.
As with exchange experiments, the evolving literature on expectations-based reference
dependence and effort provision requires further development. In field settings, the plausibil-
ity of endogenous expectations influencing labor supply is clear. Setting these expectations in
experimental studies seems to be more tenuous. It may be hard to establish relevant expec-
tations with other aspects of the decision environment serving as salient points of reference.
In Section 9, we return to such issues in our concluding thoughts.
6.3 Job Search
Recently, DellaVigna et al. (2017) investigate reference dependence in job search. Interest-
ingly, their work seems to suggest that, in this domain, a referent based on recent experience
better explains the data than a referent based on forward-looking rational expectations. In
addition, their work highlights some additional issues that can emerge as reference-dependent
preferences are taken to more sophisticated economic applications.
The starting point is a well-known empirical finding from labor economics. In many
countries, unemployment insurance follows a two-step design where there is a constant re-
placement rate for some fixed period, followed by lower benefits. In such countries, the
hazard rate from unemployment typically follows a U-shaped pattern: high hazard rates in
the days immediately following the loss of a job, then a decline in hazard rates, followed by
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an increase that peaks when the higher benefit level expires. In standard job-search models,
this pattern has been attributed to unobserved heterogeneity wherein the initial decline is
caused by selection out of the most productive job searchers, and then the later peak is
driven by the remaining less productive job searchers wanting to find a job before the higher
benefit level expires.
DellaVigna et al. (2017) suggest an alternative, reference-dependent interpretation of this
behavior that does not require unobserved heterogeneity. If a person’s reference point is her
past earnings, then a newly unemployed person will feel a strong feeling of loss and thus will
exert substantial search effort to eliminate this loss. As time passes, however, the worker’s
reference point will decline toward the benefit level, and as it does, so will her incentive to
search. Finally, as the person approaches the end of the higher benefits, she’ll want to find
a job before the higher benefit level expires.
DellaVigna et al. (2017) do not merely propose an alternative account for a known em-
pirical result. In fact, they identify a country (Hungary) that implemented a regime shift
from a standard two-step design to a three-step design in which the initial period is split
into two sub-periods, the first with a higher benefit than before and the second with a lower
benefit than before. DellaVigna et al. (2017) demonstrate that the standard model and
the reference-dependent model make distinct predictions for how hazard rates should react
to this regime change, and they demonstrate that the observed (reduced-form) empirical
reaction is much more in line with the predictions of the reference-dependent model.
An important modeling decision for DellaVigna et al. (2017) revolves around what the
referent is. Because job-search models are dynamic in the sense that an individual makes
multiple decisions over time, one must model how the referent might change over time, and
the extent to which individuals correctly understand how the referent changes over time.
Given that their hypothesis about the role of reference dependence relies on people having a
backward-looking referent that adapts over time, DellaVigna et al. assume that the referent
is an average of recent earnings, and they further assume that people fully understand
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how the referent changes over time. They also consider a more forward-looking rational-
expectations referent—specifically, the referent for period t is expected period-t earnings
from the perspective of period t − 1. This formulation does not perform as well as the
referent based on recent experience.
In terms of dealing with a more sophisticated application, there are two additional no-
table features of DellaVigna et al. (2017) that do not frequently appear in the literature on
reference-dependent preferences. First, because they are dealing with a domain in which
unobserved heterogeneity is acknowledged to be an important factor, they expand beyond
their reduced-form empirical analysis to estimate a structural model that incorporates unob-
served heterogeneity. Doing so permits them to assess the value of reference dependence in
interpreting behavior while permitting the standard model to have a fair amount of flexibil-
ity. They in fact show that the reference-dependent model without unobserved heterogeneity
outperforms a standard model with unobserved heterogeneity.
Second, DellaVigna et al. (2017) permit multiple departures from the standard model.
Although their estimated structural model of reference dependence outperforms a standard
model with unobserved heterogeneity, the resulting estimates are not entirely satisfactory
because people are estimated to be extremely impatient. DellaVigna et al. (2017) demon-
strate that if in addition people are permitted to exhibit present bias (as in Laibson (1997) or
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)), the estimated model fits the data even better with arguably
reasonable levels of patience. Hence, DellaVigna et al. (2017) illustrates how, as economists
take behavioral ideas to more sophisticated applications, it may be important to permit a
variety of phenomena.53
53This point is not really novel, as it is consistent with the usual economics approach of analyzing an
application while incorporating whatever factors are likely to be important in that application.
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6.4 Consumer Choice and Market Prices
While the applications above test predictions using experimental or field data, other ap-
plications focus more on developing predictions in economic contexts and comparing those
predictions to stylized empirical facts. A prominent example is the domain of consumer
choice.
In their original work, Koszegi and Rabin (2006) apply their model of expectations-
based loss aversion to this domain. Consider an adapted version of their model. Suppose a
consumption bundle takes the form x ≡ (x1, x2) where x1 ∈ {0, 1} is consumption of some
consumer good (say, shoes) and x2 ∈ < is money spent on that good. Hence, if a person buys
a pair of shoes at price π, then x ≡ (1,−π), and if she does not buy shoes, then x ≡ (0, 0).
Suppose the person’s intrinsic utility is u(x) = x1γ + x2, where γ > 0 reflects the intrinsic
consumption utility from shoes. The person behaves according to the KR-model described
above with a two-part-linear universal gain-loss utility function.
Now suppose that, before going to the store, the person faces price uncertainty: with
probability pl the price will be πl, and with probability ph the price will be πh > πl. This is
a natural domain in which to apply PPE, wherein in advance the person formulates a plan
for what to do at the store as a function of the price, but does not make an actual decision
until she is at the store. Applying the structure from Section 5.4, state s ∈ {l, h} generates
a choice set L(s) ≡ {(0, 0), (1,−πs)}, and a strategy L∗ must specify a planned choice for
each of the two possible market prices.
To simplify this example, suppose that πl <
1+η
1+ηλ
γ. At this price, the person will buy
no matter her beliefs.54 Hence, L∗(l) = (1,−πl), and we merely must derive the L∗(h)
consistent with PPE. If L∗(h) = (1,−πh), then the ex ante distribution over outcomes is
GBUY ≡ ((1,−πl), pl; (1,−πh), ph). If instead L∗(h) = (0, 0), then the ex ante distribu-
tion over outcomes is GNOT ≡ ((1,−πl), pl; (0, 0), ph). With a little work, one can derive
54Intuitively, this claim follows from deriving when the person would want to buy despite having the beliefs
least conducive to buying—which is when the money spent is perceived as a loss and when obtaining shoes
is perceived as a gain. See Koszegi and Rabin (2006) for the full argument.
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that there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all pl < p′ the PPE involves buying whenever
U(GBUY |GBUY ) ≥ U(GNOT |GNOT ),55 which yields buying whenever
πh ≤ γ +
2plπlΛ
1 + plΛ
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) emphasize several features of this example. First, note that
π̄G > γ, meaning that the person is willing to pay more than her valuation for the good. This
result follows from an attachment effect: because the person plans to buy when the price is
low, she is attached to buying even when the price is high in the sense that not buying will
feel like a loss. Hence, she has an extra reason to buy beyond the intrinsic value γ. Second,
as pl increases, π̄G increases. Intuitively, as the probability of the low price increases, the
attachment to buying grows stronger, thus increasing the willingness to pay when the price
is high. Third, as πl increases, π̄G increases. Intuitively, buying at price πh will feel like a
loss relative to buying at price πl, and this comparison effect counteracts the attachment
effect. The larger is πl, the smaller is this countervailing effect.
In this example, the person might pay more than her intrinsic valuation when the price
is high, but this is only because of an attachment from the possibility of buying at a low
price. Could it be that in expectation the person plans to pay more than her valuation? It
turns out that the answer is yes. More generally, Heidhues and Koszegi (2014) consider the
case of a profit-maximizing monopolist facing a KR consumer (following PPE), where the
monopolist can commit to any distribution of prices. Consistent with the intuition in the
simple example above, they show that the optimal pricing strategy involves a high regular
price πreg that is larger than the consumer’s valuation, with some chance of a lower sales
price drawn from the range π ∈ [ 1+η
1+ηλ
γ, π′] for some π′ ∈ ( 1+η
1+ηλ
γ, πreg). As in the example
above, such a pricing strategy induces the consumer to buy no matter the realized price, and
55Formally, define π̄N such that U((0, 0)|GNOT ) = U((1,−π̄N )|GNOT ), and π̄B such that
U((0, 0)|GBUY ) = U((1,−π̄B)|GBUY ). One can show π̄N < π̄B , so there are multiple PE for any
π ∈ [π̄N , π̄B ]. One can further show that π̄G > π̄N and that there exists p′ ∈ (0, 1) such that π̄G < π̄B if
and only if pl < p
′. Finally, π̄N < π̄G < π̄B implies that the PPE involves buying whenever πh ≤ π̄G.
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to pay an expected price larger than her valuation—thus yielding larger profits than merely
setting a certain π = γ.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2014) describe how this optimal pricing pattern is consistent with
some stylized facts that we observe in real-world markets. Specifically, for many goods, prices
seem to alternate between higher regular prices and lower sales prices (and, indeed, are often
labelled regular prices and sales prices). Moreover, just as predicted by the model, regular
prices tend to be pretty stable over time, whereas sales prices tend to vary from sale to sale.
However, Heidhues and Koszegi (2014) also point out two caveats. First, they highlight how
the consumer would be better off if she could commit not to visit the store. Second, they
highlight how when additional firms are added to the model, competition eliminates this
result. Hence, the prediction of regular prices and sales depends on consumers being unable
to commit not to shop, and depends on firms having some market power—both of which
seem likely true for products sold at supermarkets.
Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) consider a different implication of expectations-based loss
aversion for market prices: when firms compete in differentiated products, loss aversion tends
to reduce and can even eliminate price variation in response to cost or demand changes, and
can also generate “focal-price equilibria” in which firms that face different costs or demands
all charge the same “focal” price. To see the intuition, consider a possible equilibrium in
which all firms choose a focal price π∗ regardless of any firm-specific cost shocks, and consider
the incentive for one firm to deviate from this focal price. Because in such an equilibrium
consumers expect to pay a price π∗, if the firm chooses a higher price, paying that price
will be perceived as a loss relative to paying π∗, while if the firm chooses a lower price,
paying that price will be considered a gain. Because losses loom larger than gains, it follows
that the firm’s equilibrium residual demand curve is kinked around the focal price π∗. This
kink can serve to induce the firm to indeed choose price π∗ for a range of cost realizations—
thus supporting the equilibrium. Heidhues and Koszegi (2008) derive conditions under which
focal-price equilibria exist, and conditions under which all equilibria are focal price equilibria.
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They further argue that these results might help to explain stylized facts about real-world
pricing—especially the stickiness of retail prices.
For more work on how expectations-based loss aversion might impact market prices, see
Herweg and Mierendorff (2013), who demonstrate that, for consumers who face uncertainty
about their own demand, expectations-based loss aversion generates a preference for flat-
rate tariffs so as to avoid negative gain-loss utility that would arise if there were equilibrium
uncertainty about how much money they would spend.
6.5 Mechanism Design: Auctions
Another natural application of expectations-based loss aversion is to auctions. When one
bids in an auction, one generates expectations for the likelihood of winning the auction and
for the amount that one needs to pay in the event of winning the auction, and it seems
natural to think that the realized outcome might be judged relative to those expectations.
Lange and Ratan (2010) apply expectations-based loss aversion to first-price and second-
price auctions. They use the KR approach to gain-loss utility from equation 7, except that
they do not assume a universal gain-loss function. Rather, when one bids for a commodity,
they permit a different degree of loss aversion (different λ’s) for the commodity and for money
(analogous to equation 4 in the domain of riskless choice). Finally, they effectively assume
CPE is the relevant solution concept, motivated by the fact that in sealed-bid auctions
expectations become fixed once the bid is submitted.
Lange and Ratan focus their analysis around the difference between commodity auctions
and “induced-value auctions,” where the latter is defined to be bidding for something that is
readily converted into money—this might be induced-value tokens in laboratory experiments,
or financial assets in the field. They show, for instance, that expectations-based loss aversion
over money tends to decrease bids in first-price commodity auctions and increase bids in
first-price induced-value auctions. Intuitively, losses on the money dimension occur when
winning a commodity auction because that’s when one must pay money (thus depressing
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bids), whereas they occur when losing an induced-value auction because that’s when one
does not obtain the money prize (thus increasing bids).
Expectations-based loss aversion over the commodity has more nuanced predictions: in
both first-price and second-price auctions, it pushes bids higher for people with high val-
uations and pushes bids lower for people with low valuations. Intuitively, since obtaining
vs. not obtaining the commodity is a binary outcome, gain-loss disutility is reduced if there
is less uncertainty about which of these two outcomes will occur—i.e., if the probability of
winning the auction is pushed closer to zero or one. Hence, if a person has a high valuation
such that she is likely to win the auction, loss aversion over the commodity has an upward
impact on her bid so as to push the likelihood of winning closer to one. Analogously, if a
person has a low valuation such that she is unlikely to win the auction, loss aversion over
the commodity has a downward impact on her bid so as to push the likelihood of winning
closer to zero.
Lange and Ratan emphasize several implications of their analysis. Perhaps most impor-
tant, their analysis highlights how the existence of loss aversion on both the money and
commodity dimensions can lead to very different bidding behavior in commodity auctions
vs. induced-value auctions. Hence, one must be careful in extrapolating from laboratory
induced-value auctions to predict how people behave in field commodity auctions.
Banerji and Gupta (2014) build on the theoretical analysis from Lange and Ratan (2010)
to develop a test of expectations-based loss aversion. Specifically, they consider a special case
of a second-price auction: the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak elicitation procedure (see Becker
et al. (1964)), which is essentially a second-price auction where the other bid is determined
randomly. As in Lange and Ratan, they consider commodity auctions vs. induced-value
auctions, where they apply the KR approach to gain-loss utility from equation 7. Unlike
Lange and Ratan, however, they do assume a universal gain-loss function. Finally, they
assume CPE is the relevant solution concept.
Banerji and Gupta consider BDM auctions in which the distribution of the second bid
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is uniform on the interval [0, K]. Their focus is on how the bid distribution changes as a
function of K. Standard agents should merely bid their value, and thus K is irrelevant
(except for censoring of people with a value larger than K). In induced-value auctions,
expectations-based loss aversion does not change this prediction because in such auctions
gain-loss disutility is minimized when one bids one’s value. However, in commodity auctions
an increase in K leads a loss-averse consumer to reduce her bid (as long as her initial bid
was smaller than K).
Banerji and Gupta test these predictions experimentally by conducting BDM auctions for
a candy bar and for an induced-value token. In each case, they examined bid distributions
when K = 150 vs. when K = 200. For the commodity (candy bar) auction, they indeed find
that the distribution of bids for K = 150 first-order stochastically dominates the distribution
of bids for K = 200. For the induced-value auction, the two bid distributions are quite
similar, and moreover the majority of subjects do indeed bid their value. On net, these
results are quite consistent with the model of expectations-based loss aversion.
6.6 Mechanism Design: Optimal Contracting
Herweg et al. (2010) consider the implications of expectations-based loss aversion for incen-
tive contracts. They are motivated by a puzzle in the agency literature. Standard agency
models predict that optimal contracts should take advantage of all available information.
As one prominent example, if there is an observable performance measure, and if different
realizations of that performance measure yield different inferences about the amount of effort
that an agent exerted, then the optimal contract should pay the agent different amounts for
each realization of the performance measure. However, real-world contracts seem not to take
advantage of all available information, and indeed they frequently take a simple binary form
in which the agent receives a base amount plus a bonus if the performance measure exceeds
some critical level (see Herweg et al for a discussion of this puzzle).
Herweg et al suggest that expectations-based loss aversion might be the source of such
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contracts. Specifically, they assume an agent who behaves according to CPE with linear
utility for money and a two-part linear gain-loss utility function.56 For such an agent, the
optimal contract cannot pay a uniform wage no matter the outcome because then there
would be no incentive to exert effort (just as for a standard agent). However, the more
variation there is in the set of possible wages that might be paid, the larger is the gain-loss
disutility. Herweg et al identify conditions under which it is in fact optimal to limit the wage
to two possible values, which can be interpreted as a base wage and a bonus payment that
is paid if the performance measure is high enough.
It is worth highlighting that this result depends on assuming the KR approach to gain-loss
utility. Under the KR approach, making additional use of information in the performance
measure means introducing more ex ante uncertainty into the agent’s final wage, which in
turn means the principal must pay a higher expected wage in order to induce the agent to
sign the contract. Under the DA approach, creating spread in wages that doesn’t change the
expected wage and that doesn’t change which wages are above or below the expected wage
has no impact on gain-loss utility.
7 Reference-Dependent “News” Utility
7.1 Overview and Some History
Up to now, our entire focus has been on contemporaneous gain-loss utility—that is, gain-loss
utility experienced in period t as a result of comparing realized period-t consumption to a
referent. As we’ve seen, period-t contemporaneous gain-loss utility matters prior to period
t because a person takes it into account when making choices prior to period t that impact
period-t consumption.
This focus on consumption yielding utility when that consumption occurs is the norm for
56It is unclear whether CPE is an appropriate solution concept for agency applications. In particular, it
would be appropriate in situations where the performance measure is realized well after the effort is exerted.
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most economics. However, there is also research on various forms of “anticipatory” utility
wherein a person experiences utility now from thinking about (anticipating) consumption
in some future period.57 While most anticipatory-utility models lie outside the domain of
reference-dependent preferences, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) develop a model of reference-
dependent “news” utility. Specifically, when a person receives information (“news”) that
changes her beliefs about future consumption, she experiences gain-loss utility now derived
from comparing these new beliefs to her prior beliefs (her referent).
7.2 News Utility
Consider news utility experienced in period τ ≤ t related to consumption in period t, and
suppose beliefs about period-t consumption take the form Lt ≡ (xt1, p1;xt2, p2; ...;xtN , pN).58
Let Ltτ−1 denote the person’s prior beliefs entering period τ , and suppose the person receives
news in period τ that leads her to change her beliefs to Ltτ . Koszegi and Rabin (2009) assume
that the news utility associated with this change in beliefs is
N(Ltτ |Ltτ−1) = γτ,t
∫ 1
0
µ(x̄Ltτ (p)− x̄Ltτ−1(p))dp
where µ is a gain-loss utility function and, for each p ∈ (0, 1), x̄L(p) is such that PrL(x ≤
x̄L(p)) ≥ p and PrL(x ≤ x̄) < p for any x̄ < x̄L(p). γτ,t ∈ [0, 1] reflects the weight that
the news gets relative to the actual consumption experience in period t (that gets weight 1).
Koszegi and Rabin suggest that τ < τ ′ implies γτ,t ≤ γτ ′,t, so that news gets (weakly) less
weight the further in the future is the actual consumption.
This formulation of news utility implies N(Lt|Lt) = 0, and thus it captures that no news
means no news utility.59 Example 5 (adapted from Section III in Koszegi and Rabin (2009))
57See, for instance, Loewenstein (1987), Caplin and Leahy (2001), Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and
Koszegi (2006).
58To simplify the exposition, this treatment considers the case where consumption is a scalar. Koszegi
and Rabin (2009) develop their model for the case where consumption is a vector.
59Given the motivation from gain-loss utility, one might have thought it natural to assume N(Ltτ |Ltτ−1) =
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illustrates how this formulation works when there is actual news.
——————————————————————–
Example 5: Suppose Ltτ−1 ≡ (x, 12 ; x̄,
1
2
) with x̄ > x, and suppose further that
the person receives a signal in period t that outcome xn ∈ {x, x̄} now has prob-
ability q ≥ 1/2.
If the signal is good news, new beliefs are Ltτ ≡ (x, 1− q; x̄, q) and thus
N(Ltτ |Lτ−1) = γτ,t
[∫ 1−q
0
µ(x− x)dp+
∫ 1/2
1−q
µ(x̄− x)dp+
∫ 1
1/2
µ(x̄− x̄)dp
]
= γτ,t [(1/2− (1− q))µ(x̄− x)] = γτ,t (q − 1/2) η(x̄− x).
If the signal is bad news, new beliefs are Ltτ ≡ (x, q; x̄, 1− q) and thus
N(Ltτ |Lτ−1) = γτ,t
[∫ 1/2
0
µ(x− x)dp+
∫ q
1/2
µ(x− x̄)dp+
∫ 1
q
µ(x̄− x̄)dp
]
= γτ,t [(q − 1/2)µ(x− x̄)] = −γτ,t (q − 1/2) ηλ(x̄− x).
——————————————————————–
In Example 5, if the person receives good news about period-t consumption, she expe-
riences positive news utility, whereas if she receives bad news, she receives negative news
utility. The magnitude of the news utility depends on a combination of how informative
the news is (how much larger q is than 1/2) and how much the person cares in period τ
about period-t consumption (how much larger γτ,t is than 0). In the limit where the news is
uninformative (when q = 1/2), there is no news utility—illustrating the more general point
that N(L|L) = 0. In the other limit where the news fully resolves the uncertainty (when
γτ,tELtτ v(x
t|Ltτ−1) where v is as in equation (7). However, that formulation would yield the unnatural
implication that N(Lt|Lt) < 0.
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q = 1), the news utility is equivalent to what standard contemporaneous gain-loss utility
would be, except that it is discounted by γτ,t. This latter point highlights that, with this
formulation of news utility, contemporaneous gain-loss utility is a merely a special case of
news utility where news is received in period t about the realization of period-t consumption.
7.3 News Utility and Decision Making
Because news utility is inherently an intertemporal concept, it must be incorporated into a
model of intertemporal utility. A natural approach is to assume that news utility experienced
in period τ is merely an additive term in the period-τ instantaneous utility function.
To illustrate, consider a model with consumption in periods 1 and 2. As a function of
period-1 consumption (x1), prior beliefs about period-1 and period-2 consumption (L10 and
L20), and period-1 beliefs about period-2 consumption (L
2
1), period-1 intertemporal utility
might be [
u(x1) + v(x1|L10) +N(L21|L20)
]
+ δ
[
EL21(u(x
2) + v(x2|L21))
]
(11)
where δ ≤ 1 is a standard time-discounting factor.
Much as for the expectations-based models discussed in Section 5.2, this model in prin-
ciple permits some flexibility in the source of beliefs. Equation (11) already incorporates an
assumption that period-1 beliefs about period-2 consumption (L21) become the referent in
period 2. A second natural assumption—though the model would be coherent without it—is
that those period-1 beliefs should be formed from the prior beliefs and the news using Bayes
rule. Finally—and most analogous to static expectations-based models—the prior beliefs
could in principle be exogenous or endogenous. Analogous to our discussion in Section 5.3,
the former might reflect that the person is surprised in period 1 with this choice situation,
whereas the latter might reflect that the person is informed of the choice situation in ad-
vance and formulates a plan. Indeed, for the latter case, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) develop
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a dynamic version of PPE.60
In their online appendix, Koszegi and Rabin (2009) highlight how their static formulations
of PPE and CPE (defined in Section 5.3 above) can be thought of as special cases of their
dynamic formulation of PPE where (i) all outcomes occur and all uncertainty is resolved in
some period t, and (ii) the person formulates a plan (for PPE) or commits to a choice (for
CPE) in some period τ < t with γτ,t = 0. The key issue is that the act of formulating a plan
(for PPE) or committing to a choice (for CPE) creates news—beliefs in period τ shift from
prior beliefs to the beliefs associated with the plan or choice. This shift in beliefs is ignored
in the static versions of PPE and CPE. If γτ,t = 0, then that shift in beliefs in period τ
is indeed irrelevant; otherwise, however, the plan or choice must be made while also taking
into account the impact on news utility experienced in period τ . The latter case further
highlights how one must be careful when applying the static version of CPE or PPE (as
discussed in Section 5.4).
7.4 Applications of News Utility
Thus far, there have been fewer applications of reference-dependent news utility than there
have been applications of expectations-based loss aversion. But some initial work is promis-
ing.
Koszegi and Rabin (2009) emphasize that their model has two implications for preferences
over the resolution of uncertainty. First, because γτ,t < γτ ′,t for τ < τ
′, the model implies
that people like news earlier rather than later. Second, and perhaps more important, because
loss aversion implies that, in expectation, each piece of news yields negative news utility, the
model implies that people do not like piecemeal news—i.e., they prefer less-frequent, more-
informative signals to more-frequent, less-informative signals. Falk and Zimmermann (2017)
60As in most models of anticipatory utility, news utility causes intertemporal preferences to be time-
inconsistent. In the two-period example, for instance, whereas the anticipatory utility N(L21|L20) impacts
the person’s period-1 intertemporal preferences, when period 2 arrives N(L21|L20) is no longer relevant. The
dynamic version of PPE assumes that people must follow a consistent plan, but one could imagine alternative
assumptions.
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find empirical support for both implications.
Pagel (2018) develops the importance of the second implication by embedding news utility
in a stochastic life-cycle model of portfolio choice.61 Pagel demonstrates that, in order to
receive news about one’s portfolio via less-frequent, more-informative signals, people choose
to ignore their portfolios for extended periods of time. Moreover, because people would still
like to have their portfolios actively rebalanced even while they are ignoring them, people
are willing to pay for a portfolio manager. Finally, because portfolio accounts are monitored
infrequently while checking accounts (used for consumption) are monitored frequently, the
model implies different marginal propensities to consume out of these two accounts.
Koszegi and Rabin (2009) also develop their model’s implications for consumption-savings
decisions using a stylized two-period model. Pagel (2017a) expands on this approach by
embedding news utility in a life-cycle consumption-saving model with a single asset. She
finds that news utility yields excess smoothness in consumption, a life-cycle consumption
profile that is hump-shaped, and a drop in consumption at retirement. In addition, Pagel
(2015) investigates the implications of news utility for asset pricing, and argues that the
model can explain the historical equity premium using reasonable parameter values.
8 Probability Weighting
8.1 Overview and Some History
While our primary focus in this chapter is reference-dependent preferences, we take a short
detour before we conclude to discuss probability weighting, and in particular to highlight
some connections between probability weighting and expectations-based loss aversion.
Probability weighting was incorporated into prospect theory to accommodate the Al-
61In finance applications, uncertainty in current beliefs can be strongly correlated with uncertainty in prior
beliefs. To account for this correlation, Pagel uses a different formulation of news utility that is qualitatively
similar to the Koszegi and Rabin (2009) formulation but quantitatively more tractable. For a detailed
discussion of this approach, see Pagel (2017b).
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lais paradoxes and other EU deviations not naturally accommodated by loss aversion. The
insights derived from probability weighting have been particularly valuable for analyzing
decisionmaking with relatively low probability events. Insurance choice, gambling, and fi-
nancial investment present natural environments for application.
In their presentation of probability weighting, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognize a
potential problem: nonlinear probability weighting can lead to violations of dominance. They
address this problem by assuming that dominated options are eliminated from consideration
at the editing stage that is described in Section 3.4. Shortly thereafter, a more elegant
solution to the problem of dominance was proposed by Quiggin (1982): the model of rank-
dependent probability weighting (RDPW).62 This model was quickly adopted, and later a
variant was incorporated into cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992).
In recent years, RDPW has received more attention in the behavioral-economics literature
for several reasons. First, it turns out that some models of expectations-based loss aversion—
most notably, CPE—are indistinguishable from RDPW. Second, there has been a recognition
that rank dependence has its own substantive predictions, and some initial tests of those
predictions have not found support.
8.2 Simple Nonlinear Probability Weighting
Under EU, the decision weight applied to outcome n is the probability pn of that outcome
occurring. The basic idea of probability weighting is that equation 1 is replaced by
U(L) ≡
N∑
n=1
ωnu(xn)
62When RDPW is applied in a model with a utility function defined over final wealth (as in EU), it is
often labelled “rank-dependent expected utility” (RDEU). We use the label “rank-dependent probability
weighting” to refer to the weighting component of the model, recognizing that it could be applied as in
RDEU, but it could also be applied in models with reference-dependent preferences. To isolate the impact
of probability weighting, the majority of this section focuses on models of probability weighting combined
with a utility function defined over final wealth states.
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where ωn is a weight that might differ from pn. Original formulations assume that ωn is
simply a transformation of pn. In other words, there exists a probability weighting function
π(p) such that ωn = π(pn).
The idea of probability weighting predates prospect theory (see Section 3.1); the real
contribution of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) to the literature on probability weighting
was to propose—based on their experimental evidence—several features for the function
π(p). These features include:
• Overweighting (π(p) > p) of small probabilities and underweighting (π(p) < p) of large
probabilities.
• Subcertainty: π(p) + π(1− p) < π(1) ≡ 1 (which is needed to accommodate the Allais
common-consequence paradox).
• Subproportionality: For any p, q, r ∈ (0, 1), π(pq)/π(p) < π(pqr)/π(pr) (which is
needed to accommodate the Allais common-ratio paradox).
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) did not provide a parameterized functional form, but
rather provided a figure like that depicted in Panel A of Figure 6 that satisfies these prop-
erties. Note that this function is discontinuous at p = 0 and p = 1, suggesting that cer-
tain outcomes are treated in a discontinuously different way from probabilistic outcomes.
The literature quickly abandoned this discontinuity and instead focused on inverse-S-shaped
weighting functions as depicted in Panel B of Figure 6.63
A problem with simple probability weighting is that it generates violations of dominance.
Suppose π satisfies subcertainty and thus π(p) + π(1− p) < 1. If so, then there exists ε′ > 0
such that (x, 1)  (x+ε, p;x+2ε, 1−p) for all ε < ε′ because the sum of the weights applied
to x+ ε and x+ 2ε in the latter option is strictly smaller than the weight applied to x in the
former option. Numerous additional examples can easily be generated. As another example,
63For more details on possible functional forms, see Table 1 and Figure 2 in Barseghyan et al. (2018).
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Note: Panel A presents a probability weighting function of the form suggested by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). Panel B presents probability weighting functions corresponding to the functional forms from Tversky
and Kahneman (1992) with γ = 0.61 (solid black line) and Prelec (1998) with α = 0.65 (solid gray line). In
both panels, dotted line corresponds to no probability weighting.
Figure 6: Some Probability Weighting Functions
if π(1/n) > 1/n, then then there exists ε′ > 0 such that (x−ε, 1/n;x−2ε, 1/n; ...x−nε, 1/n) 
(x, 1) for all ε < ε′.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) recognize this problem, and address it by assuming that
dominated options are eliminated from consideration at the editing stage. Shortly thereafter,
Quiggin (1982) proposed a more elegant solution.
8.3 Rank-Dependent Probability Weighting
In order to avoid violations of dominance, Quiggin (1982) proposed that instead of the
weight ωn being a simple transformation of the probability pn, it is a transformation of
the cumulative probability of obtaining at most xn. That is, when evaluating a prospect
L ≡ (x1, p1;x2, p2; ...;xN , pN), the decision maker first orders the outcomes by rank such
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that x1 ≤ x2 ≤ .... ≤ xN . The decision maker then evaluates lottery L according to
U(L) =
N∑
n=1
(
π
(
n∑
m=1
pm
)
− π
(
n−1∑
m=1
pm
))
u(xn)
where π(·) is a weighting function that is increasing and has π(0) = 0 and π(1) = 1. In other
words, under this rank-dependent probability weighting (RDPW), the weight on outcome
xn is
ωn = π
(
n∑
m=1
pm
)
− π
(
n−1∑
m=1
pm
)
.
Several features of RDPW are worth noting. First, if π(p) = p then ωn = pn. Hence,
RDPW deviates from standard weighting only if the function π(·) is nonlinear. Second, for
any lottery that might be evaluated, the weights always sum to one. This feature eliminates
the violations of dominance described in Section 8.2.
Third, the implications of RDPW depend on the functional form for π(·). Because in
many examples simple probability weighting and RDPW coincide, the literature has used
the same functional forms as depicted in Figure 6. Indeed, much of the research that has
generated those functional forms does so in reference to certainty equivalents for gambles
of the form (x, p; 0, 1 − p). If, as is frequently done, one further assumes u(0) = 0—e.g.,
when one applies a simple gain-loss utility function—both simple probability weighting and
RDPW imply that the certainty equivalent z̄ satisfies u(z̄) = π(p)u(x).
When applying these functional forms to gambles with more outcomes, RDPW generates
a different psychology of decision making relative to simple probability weighting. Under
simple probability weighting, an outcome is overweighted if the likelihood of it occurring is
small enough. Under RDPW, in contrast, extreme outcomes are overweighted. To highlight
this point, consider two examples:
——————————————————————–
Example 6: Consider a lottery (xA, .10;xB, .45;xC , .45), and consider one of the
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functional forms in Figure 6 panel B.
• Under simple probability weighting, the weight on outcome xA is π(.10), regardless of
its rank, and thus would be overweighted.
• Under RDPW, if outcome xA is the worst outcome, then it gets weight π(.10) and is
thus overweighted. If outcome xA is the best, then it gets weight 1− π(.90) and thus
would also be overweighted. However, if outcome xA is the middle outcome, then it
gets weight π(.55)− π(.45), and thus would be underweighted.64
Example 7: Consider a lottery with many possible outcomes, each of which
occurs with a small probability, and let F (x) be the cumulative probability that
the lottery yields at most x. Roughly speaking, if outcome x has dπ(F (x))
dp
> 1
then the outcome will be overweighted and if outcome x has dπ(F (x))
dp
< 1 then
the outcome will be underweighted. Hence, for an inverse-S-shaped probability
weighting function, the smallest and the largest x’s are overweighted.
——————————————————————–
When Tversky and Kahneman (1992) introduced “cumulative prospect theory” (CPT)
as an improved version of prospect theory, they incorporated a variant of RDPW in which
probability weighting is applied differentially to gains and losses. Specifically, if a decision
maker with reference point r evaluates a prospect L where x1 ≤ .... ≤ xn̄ < r ≤ xn̄+1 ≤ ... ≤
xN , the decision weights are:
ωn =

π− (
∑n
m=1 pm)− π1
(∑n−1
m=1 pm
)
if n ≤ n̄
π+
(∑N
m=n pm
)
− π+
(∑N
m=m+1 pm
)
if n > n̄
64The common functional forms all have π(.10) > .10, π(.90) < .90, and, since the slope is less than one
in this range, π(.55)− π(.45) < .10.
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In this formulation, π+ is the probability weighting function applied to gains, and π− is
the probability weighting function applied to losses—where both would have the inverse-S-
shaped functional form.
RDPW—often under the label RDEU—has been prominent in the decision-theory liter-
ature (see, e.g., Abdellaoui (2002)). In addition, there is a large experimental literature that
estimates the CPT model (see, e.g., Bruhin et al. (2010)). In applied work, RDPW (often in
the CPT form) has perhaps had its largest impact in the domains of finance and gambling,
where researchers have developed the impact of the overweighting of extreme outcomes (see
in particular Barberis (2013) and Chapter X of this volume).
8.4 RDPW vs. CPE
RDPW delivers deviations from expected utility based upon distortions of cumulative prob-
abilities. The CPE model described in Section 5.3.2 delivers deviations from expected utility
based on sensations of gain and loss. These different psychologies have a common force
at their core: both rely on the ranking of outcomes. In RDPW, the rank of an outcome
determines the cumulative probability of weakly inferior and superior outcomes and the
corresponding distortion. In CPE, the rank of an outcome determines the number of com-
parisons to other outcomes that will be coded as gains and losses. Recent research has
identified some tight connections between these models.
Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) take a decision-theory approach to ask when different
models have different implications for behavior. They discover that, as long as Λ ≤ 1
(which rules out violations of dominance), CPE is equivalent to a special case of RDPW. To
illustrate, consider a binary lottery L ≡ (x, p; y, 1− p) with x < y. Applying equation 8,
U(L|L) = [p+ p(1− p)Λ]u(x) + [1− [p+ p(1− p)Λ]]u(y).
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This is equivalent to RDEU with weighting function π(p) = p+ p(1− p)Λ (note that Λ ≤ 1
guarantees that π(p) is increasing for all p).65
Barseghyan et al. (2013b) and Barseghyan et al. (2018) make the same point from the
direction of identification. Specifically, they consider a model that incorporates both RDPW
and CPE. For the case of binary lotteries of the form above, they show the lottery is evaluated
according to
U(L|L) = [π(p) + π(p)(1− π(p))Λ]u(x) + [1− [π(p) + π(p)(1− π(p))Λ]]u(y).
Hence, even if one were able to identify the combined weight Ω(p) ≡ π(p) +π(p)(1−π(p))Λ,
it would not be possible to break this apart to estimate Λ and π(p)—that is, Λ from CPE
and π(·) from RDPW are not separately identified.66
Given this identification issue, one approach is to focus on estimating the combined
weight Ω(p). Barseghyan et al. (2013a) do so using data on insurance-deductible choices for
home and auto insurance. They assume that households’ subjective beliefs for p correspond
to an econometrician’s best guess based on household characteristics and past claims data,
and they take three non-parametric approaches to estimating Ω(p). All three approaches
yield a function that looks qualitatively like the probability weighting from Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) (depicted in Panel A of Figure 6). Because such a functional form is in fact
inconsistent with the CPE implied π(p) = p + p(1− p)Λ, they conclude that there must be
some RDPW driving behavior. Given the identification issue, however, they cannot assess
whether CPE might also be playing a role.
Masatlioglu and Raymond (2016) further show that the link between RDPW and DA is
less tight. For binary lotteries, DA is equivalent to CPE and thus also exhibits the equiv-
65More generally, Masatlioglu and Raymond prove that, for any choice set of lotteries with discrete out-
comes, CPE with Λ ≤ 1 is equivalent to RDEU with π(p) = p+ p(1− p)Λ.
66More generally, Barseghyan et al. (2018) prove (in their appendix) that, for any choice set of lotteries
with discrete outcomes, the combination of CPE with Λ ≤ 1 and RDPW with probability weighting function
π(p) is equivalent to an RDEU model with probability weighting function Ω(p) ≡ π(p) + π(p)(1− π(p))Λ.
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alences above.67 For lotteries with more than two outcomes, DA yields distinct predictions
from RDPW and CPE. That said, given the similar intuitions behind these models, in prac-
tice it is a bit unclear how different the predictions are likely to be.
8.5 Tests of Rank Dependence
With the realization that rank dependence has real implications in terms of overweighting
extreme outcomes, along with the recognition of the connection between RDPW and CPE,
direct tests of rank dependence take on new importance. Indeed, one can even think of a
test of rank dependence in lotteries with more than two outcomes also being a test of CPE.
In fact, rank dependence has received limited attention as a feature to be tested. Two
exceptions are Wu (1994) and Wakker et al. (1994), which examine whether a preference
between two lotteries is maintained when common outcomes are replaced without changing
outcome ranks, a critical axiom of rank-dependent models termed “comonotonic indepen-
dence.” Their findings show that comonotonic independence and non-comonotonic indepen-
dence are violated at similar rates in experimental samples, a prima-facie unfavorable result
for rank-dependent models. The conclusions from comparing violation rates, however, are
not particularly strong as random choice and near indifference between lotteries could easily
rationalize the observed data patterns. It is perhaps for this reason that these early tests
are not well known.
Recently, Bernheim and Sprenger (2017) provide a direct test of rank dependence based
on three-outcome prospects. Consider a three-outcome prospect with x1 6= x2 > x3 and
p1 = p2 = p3 = 1/3. Bernheim and Sprenger’s experiment increases x2 to x2 + m and asks
subjects to report the “equalizing reduction” in x3 to x3−k that makes the subject indifferent.
The equalizing reduction concerns trade-offs between x2 and x3. If probability distortions
are rank-dependent, these trade-offs, and hence k, should be sensitive to whether x1 > x2 or
67For two-outcome gambles, the Gul (1991) variant of DA is also a special case of RDEU (see Abdellaoui
and Bleichrodt (2007) and Barseghyan et al. (2013a)).
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x1 < x2. Bernheim and Sprenger also estimate CPT probability weighting using standard
prospect theory assessment tasks. As such they can predict precisely how much k should
change as ranks change. Though k is predicted to change by 20-40% across conditions,
the data are tightly organized around zero change and, hence, zero rank dependence in
probability distortions at both the aggregate and individual level.
Clearly more work is needed to more fully assess the assumption of rank dependence.
A closely related question is to what extent the assumption of rank dependence is required
in applications of probability weighting. Indeed, in applications where the small-probability
events are also the extreme events, models with simple probability weighting as in Section
8.2 would likely yield similar results. But since that approach suffers from violations of
dominance, it might be fruitful to develop alternative approaches that also are able to capture
the key features of simple probability weighting.
9 Discussion
We have detailed in this chapter how the literature on reference-dependent preferences has
progressed a long ways, especially in the past two decades, and has yielded valuable insights
for interpreting a number of laboratory and field behaviors. That said, there is still much
room for improvement. We conclude by discussing several unresolved questions.
Welfare implications : This chapter has taken a positive approach to reference-dependent
preferences, focusing on whether models of reference-dependent preferences are consistent
with observed behavior. This focus mirrors that in the literature, as there is relatively little
discussion of the welfare implications of reference-dependent preferences.
When one takes a normative approach to reference-dependent preferences, a number of
issues arise. Perhaps first and foremost is the question of whether gain-loss utility should
be given normative weight—i.e., whether we should assume that the same preferences that
rationalize behavior should also be used for welfare analysis. If gain-loss utility represents
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true feelings of “pleasure” and “pain,” it seems natural to assume that it should be given
normative weight. However, the fact that relatively innocuous changes in experimental
procedures seem able to induce people to re-code gains and losses in different ways would
seem to cast doubt on this conclusion.
A related normative question is whether people correctly forecast future feelings of gains
and losses. In dynamic situations in which the referent adjusts over time, projection bias
(Loewenstein et al. (2003)) might lead people to underappreciate those changes. For instance,
if people adapt quickly to changes in one’s endowment, projection bias might lead people to
act as if their gain-loss utility is much larger than it actually is. More simple than projection
bias, it could even be that people merely under- or over-estimate their degree of loss aversion.
As the literature on reference-dependent preferences continues to develop, it will be im-
portant to tackle these and other normative issues.
Portability and stability of preferences : An important virtue of a model of decision making
is that it be portable (Rabin (2013)). In other words, it is helpful if the model is written in
a way that any researcher would know how to apply the model in any application. At first
glance, models of reference-dependent preferences seem highly portable. However, once one
recognizes the importance of assumptions about bracketing and about the referent (more on
the latter below), and the lack of systematic guidance for how to make such assumptions, the
model becomes somewhat less portable—and thus requires more judgment from the modeler.
Even if a model is portable, a related issue is whether an individual’s preferences within
that model can be expected to be stable across contexts. For instance, even if we were
confident that a person were an EU maximizer, and we quantitatively estimated the per-
son’s risk preferences from one context (say, insurance choices), it would be nice if those
estimated risk preferences could be used to accurately predict behavior in another context
(say, asset-investment choices). In fact, there is relatively little research on the stability of
risk preferences (for an overview, see Section 7.1 in Barseghyan et al. (2018)). Chapter X of
this handbook on structural behavioral economics provides additional discussion of prefer-
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ence stability in terms of a set of estimated parameters being able to meaningfully predict
behavior in related out-of-sample environments.
Of course, given that all models in economics are incomplete—they are simplifications of
reality—it would be surprising if there were complete quantitative consistency across con-
texts. That said, as the literature on reference-dependent preferences continues to develop,
it will be useful to investigate how much we can use research in one environment to predict
behavior in another.
Diminishing sensitivity : Most applications of reference-dependent preferences focus en-
tirely on loss aversion, and ignore the possibility of diminishing sensitivity (typically by
assuming a two-part linear gain-loss utility function).
For many applications, diminishing sensitivity would seem to have a relatively minor
impact on predictions. Consider, for instance, the real-effort task in Abeler et al. (2011)
discussed in Section 6.2. Under a two-part-linear value function, subjects who choose e < 3
or e > 7 (in either treatment) should not be influenced at all by whether F = 3 or F = 7.
All the action is for those who choose e ∈ [3, 7]. With diminishing sensitivity, in contrast,
those with e < 3 (e > 7) should work less in the F = 7 (F = 3) treatment because they
are further in the loss (gain) domain and thus, with diminishing sensitivity, face a smaller
marginal benefit from effort. Hence, diminishing sensitivity has an impact in this domain.
At the same time, however, the main effects of bunching at F and a strong incentive to
change effort for those with e ∈ [3, 7] are unchanged, and we suspect these effects would
swamp the more minor diminishing-sensitivity effects.
For some applications, however, diminishing sensitivity plays a critical role in delivering
phenomena. As noted in Section 4.4, the disposition effect of agents wishing to realize capital
gains and avoid capital losses has a natural diminishing-sensitivity interpretation. Another
application related to diminishing sensitivity is Bowman et al. (1999), who consider a model
of how people react to income shocks. If an income shock implies that a person will need
to take losses in the form of consuming below her reference point, diminishing sensitivity
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implies that she would prefer to concentrate those losses in one period rather than spread
them over time. Moreover, diminishing sensitivity further implies that probabilistic losses
are preferred to certain losses. Hence, when people experience a negative income shock,
they resist taking any losses now because they would be certain, whereas future losses are
probabilistic (there might be a good income shock in the future). For positive shocks,
in contrast diminishing sensitivity, like intrinsic utility, implies a desire to smooth gains.
The combined prediction, then, is that we should see asymmetric responses to negative vs.
positive income shocks. Bowman et al indeed point to evidence that supports this prediction
of diminishing sensitivity.
These applications hint at the type of situation in which diminishing sensitivity is likely
to be important—situations in which people face a choice between one large loss and mul-
tiple small losses, possibly across time, possibly across states, or possibly across different
dimensions of consumption. More generally, the literature still needs to develop a better
sense of when diminishing sensitivity is important.
The referent : Finally, and perhaps most important, is the issue of what the referent is.
The literature on reference-dependent preferences has suggested a number of possibilities:
the status quo (e.g., prior wealth), past experience, focal outcomes, aspirations, and expecta-
tions. As we’ve discussed, the lack of clear guidance on what the referent should be creates a
major degree of freedom in the model, one that has been taken advantage of in applications.
Koszegi and Rabin (2006) developed their model of expectations-based loss aversion in
large part to impose some discipline in how people apply reference-dependent preferences. In
assuming that the referent is expectations and closing the model via rational expectations,
they removed much of the model’s flexibility (especially in PPE and CPE). Unfortunately,
these more disciplined versions of the KR model have found mixed success in interpreting
observed behaviors. For instance, in laboratory experiments on exchange behavior and effort
provision, a reasonable reading of the literature would be that the force of endogenous ex-
pectations cannot be reliably observed. A possible interpretation is that other aspects of the
96
decision environment, including plausible other salient referents, hamper the establishment
of forward-looking expectations. While it is possible to rationalize behaviors such as the
endowment effect by appealing to non-endogenous expectations, such as with an appeal to
“surprise situations,” once we open the door to flexibility in how expectations get estab-
lished, we reintroduce a certain degree of flexibility into the model. Though principled use
of such degrees of freedom may be warranted, we must proceed with caution.
In evaluating the contribution of expectations-based reference points, it is critical to take
a historical perspective. In the years following the publication of Kahneman and Tversky’s
seminal 1979 paper, a number of shortfalls were noted (principal among them dominance).
The model’s subsequent refinement and implementation took at least a decade, with the body
of useful applications slowly taking shape alongside this refinement. Expectations-based loss
aversion must be evaluated with the same patient historical lens.
Valuable enhancements to expectations-based models could take many forms — as one
example, DellaVigna et al. (2017) incorporate both habituation and forecasted gains and
losses in their formulation of the referent. It seems likely that different environments will
call for different refinements as environmental forces call attention to different plausible
referents. Absent an overarching theory for the sensitivity of referents to environmental
forces, researchers should use (and recognize that they are using) their judgment in positing
which referents are likely to be important in a given environment. At the same time, they
should seriously engage methods to assess that judgment—perhaps by testing the robustness
of conclusions to different assumptions about the referent, and perhaps even by developing
techniques to let the data “nonparametrically” reveal what the referent might be for a
particular environment.
Finally, it might be that we need to start considering models with multiple referents.
Existing research tends to presume that the referent is based on past experience or on
endogenous expectations or on some salient benchmark. It is plausible that decision makers
are simultaneously influenced by two or more referents. When assessing how happy one is
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with one’s salary, one might in part compare it to the past, in part compare it to expectations,
and in part compare it to the average of one’s peers. Of course, permitting multiple referents
makes the task even more difficult, and opens up further degrees of freedom. But if the goal
is to best understand the behaviors that we observe in the world, researchers should not shy
away from the task.
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